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INTRODUCTION

"In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses againsthim ....1

This Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives the accused
in all criminal prosecutions "the right... to be confronted [by] the witnesses

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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against him."2 Those seemingly simple words known as the Confrontation
Clause have been exalted by the United States Supreme Court as a crucial trial
right, diminished by that same Court as "not absolute," revered by those who
see its merits, and decried by those who favor expedient, simple convictions.
Whether the Confrontation Clause was prompted by the beheading of Sir
Walter Raleigh; foreshadowed by the writings of Pierre Ayrault; or ordained
by its early connections with the church, the state, and demands for fairness, the
history of the right in this country has been almost as jaded as its origin. The
rights protected by the Clause have flourished and waned and have been laid
to rest and resurrected. And, as much as any other constitutional issue in the
last century, the Confrontation Clause has provided the backdrop for a rare
commentary on the High Court's parsing of rights and rationales. This Article
will explore the ambiguities and conflicts created by a Court faced with
untangling itself from its former grasp of a fundamental concept of
fairness-the right of confrontation in a criminal case.
For more than one hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has
grappled with the eight words in the Sixth Amendment, collectively referred
to as the Confrontation Clause. The Court's opinions have been varied and
astonishingly inconsistent. Unequivocal statements in holdings have been
repudiated or explained away in often inexplicable ways. What has emerged,
most commentators agree, is a complicated, unsettled constitutional right.
What is the reason for the various interpretations of those few words? Is it
attributable to the history surrounding the Sixth Amendment? Can it be
explained simply by change in membership and philosophy of the Court? Have
changes in trial process caused the Court to revise its interpretations? Are the
different interpretations a result of the four primary kinds of cases that raise
confrontation issues? Or is some combination of these and other factors
responsible for the hodgepodge jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause?
The thesis of this Article is that the Court's present interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause is inconsistent, undisciplined, and result-oriented. That
indictment is largely due to the Court's decisions which ultimately replaced a
fundamental constitutional right with a rule of evidence. This approach resulted
in the virtual elimination of a crucial constitutional guarantee. This Article
concludes by recommending that the Court reevaluate its current interpretation
in light of relevant history and early Confrontation Clause cases. Furthermore,
the Article suggests the Court restore the confrontation right to constitutional
significance as one of an intertwined bundle of fundamental trial rights, the
purpose of which is to assure the integrity of the American adversarial system
of justice.
Part II discusses various views of the history of the Confrontation Clause.
Part III describes and analyzes the four kinds of cases in which the Court has
addressed Confrontation Clause issues. This delineation is necessary because,

2. Id.
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at times, the Court's interpretation appears case-type specific. The delineation
is used throughout the Article to describe the history of the Confrontation
Clause in this country and the approaches to resolving confrontation issues.
The second section of Part III discusses the Court's major Confrontation Clause
cases in chronological order. The chronology is used to explore whether the
Court's varied interpretations can be explained based on when the cases were
decided in relation to decisions in other types of confrontation cases. Part IV
of the Article categorizes and discusses each approach used by the Court in
applying the Confrontation Clause, including specific, unique approaches used
by individual Justices. Part V suggests a consistent approach for applying the
Confrontation Clause in all situations.
II.

HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The history of the Confrontation Clause has been debated frequently, yet
its genesis is claimed to be undeterminable Many trace its origin to the trial
and conviction of Sir Walter Raleigh in the early 1600s. 4 However, most
recognize much earlier beginnings of a right to confrontation and attach the
Clause's origin to ancient civilizations. 5
Regardless of the origins of the right, courts in this country have repeatedly
linked the Confrontation Clause, and its interpretation, to English common law
as it existed at the time of the Bill of Rights. This linkage has misled courts into
defining the rights conferred by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
as being consistent with confrontation rights that existed in England.
Persuasive scholars have suggested that the American right to
confrontation is not an outgrowth of either the English common law or
constitutional law, but is rather a byproduct of the American adversarial system

3. In the words of Justice Harlan, "[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded

parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring). See, e.g., ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1992) (concluding that the "origins of confrontation are obscure"); FRANCIS
H. HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENTTO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
33 (1951) (suggesting that the development of the right to confrontation cannot be definitively
traced); Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill ofRights, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 295, 332 n. 181 (1981) ("The clause was debated for a mere five minutes before its
adoption."); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 77, 77 (1995) ("The origins of the Confrontation Clause are
murky."); Murl A. Larkin, The Right ofConfrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH L. REv. 67, 67
(1969) ("The precise source of this use of the word 'confront' is obscure .... ").

4.

HELLER,

supra note 3, at 33; Daniel Shaviro, The Supreme Court's Bifurcated

Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383, 384 (1990); see
generallyJonakait, supra note 3, at 81 n. 18 (listing articles).

5. See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and
Medieval Precursorsof the ConfrontationClause,34 VA. J. INT'LL. 481,482-533 (1994) (noting
the Court's quotation of Acts 25:16 in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988)).
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created by the American colonists. While this view is supported by history and

consistent with the development of an adversarial trial process, many argue,
nonetheless, that the history of the Confrontation Clause cannot be conclusively
established.7

The relevance of the genesis of confrontation rights and of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause can be seen in its effect on modem
interpretation. Should the clause be interpreted consistently with the narrow
protection said to have been afforded in England-to be free from conviction
on the basis of ex parte affidavits? 8 Or is it more correctly viewed as a part of
a "confluence of advocacy tools" originating with the founding of the
9
American adversary system in pre-Revolutionary America?

A.

The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh and the ConfrontationClause

Many attribute the inclusion of a Confrontation Clause in the American
Bill of Rights to the beheading of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1618 at the Tower of
London for "High Treason."'" History teaches that the Clause has far earlier
beginnings," but it remains emotionally linked with the conviction, and
eventual beheading, of Raleigh based on proof made through ex parte
affidavits. Raleigh, in his last letter to his wife, demonstrated a keen awareness
of the role the absence of confrontation played in his trial and conviction. His

6. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 81-82.
7. See Larkin, supra note 3, at 67.
8. This was the limited construction that the government urged the Court to accept in White
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). The Court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
rejected this construction. Id. at 352 ("Such a narrow reading of the Confrontation Clause, which
would virtually eliminate its role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony, is foreclosed
by our prior cases."). At least at that time, Justice Thomas was not so quick to discard the
argument. Id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[O]ur Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has
evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause itself.").
But see infra notes 452-58 and accompanying text (discussing development ofJustice Thomas's
views on the Confrontation Clause).
9. Jonakait, supra note 3, at 164.
10. Raleigh, a favorite of Queen Elizabeth I, was accused of plotting to overthrow the
English throne shortly after Elizabeth I died and was replaced by James, King of Scotland and
son of Mary, Queen of Scots. Despite early indications that the King would disfavor him,
Raleigh continued efforts to work with and gain the King's regard. Even after the King removed
him from his position of Governor of Jersey, Raleigh appeared to ride with the King in a hunt.
Instead, the King had Raleigh removed and interrogated by the Privy Council about treason.
Notwithstanding Raleigh's claimed lack of knowledge, the Council arraigned Raleigh for trial.
Christopher Smith, Biography of Sir Walter Raleigh, in BRITANNIA BIOGRAPHIES, Pt. 15, at
http://www.britannia.com/bios/raleighlout.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
11. Early Roman law required that the accuser be present in court to state the charge and
produce evidence and that the accused have the opportunity to encounter the accuser. Herrmann
& Speer, supra note 5, at 485-86. An early amendment to the Justinian Code of 534, Novel 90,
made in 539, required that prosecution witnesses be produced in the presence of the accused. Id.
at 491. The early canon law similarly required that opposing witnesses be encountered in court.
Id. at 496-99.
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words were these: "That Almighty God... teach me to forgive my persecutors
and false accusers, and send us to meet in his glorious Kingdome."' 2
On the morning of trial, Raleigh heard the five charges13 against him for
the first time. The prosecution, led by Sir Edward Coke, introduced evidence
in the form of a sworn confession from Raleigh's alleged co-conspirator, Lord
Cobham. Raleigh complained and attempted to call Lord Cobham as a witness,
inferring a recantation.
But it is strange to see how you press me still with my Lord
Cobham, and yet will not produce him .... [H]e is in the

house hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be
produced, and if he will yet accuse me or avow this
confession of his, it shall convict me and ease you of further
proof."
Cobham was not called to the witness stand, but Raleigh was allowed to
introduce a letter written by the witness. 5 The prosecution produced a rebuttal
letter and a witness. The witness, a boat pilot, testified that someone in Portugal
told him, "Your king [James] shall never be crowned for Don Cobham and Don
Raleigh will cut his throat before he can be crowned."' 6 Raleigh reportedly
objected to this testimony claiming "[t]his is the saying of some wild Jesuit or
beggarly priest; but what proof is it against me?"' 7 Thus, the witnesses against

12. The letter from Sir Walter Raleigh to his wife, Lady Elizabeth Raleigh, can be viewed
at http://www.rgjeib.com/thoughts/dust/dust.html.
13. Raleigh was charged with plotting with Lord Cobham to overthrow the King in favor
of the King's cousin; with plotting to capture the King and force him to relax anti-papal
legislation (the Bye Plot); with encouraging the King's cousin to write the King of Spain for
support; with instigating another to raise 600,000 crowns; and with respect to a lost manuscript
book which allegedly confirmed the treasonous plot. See Smith, supra note 10.
14. Raleigh's Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 15 (1603).
15. Id. In another twist, historians report that the letter arrived in Raleigh's cell at the
Tower of London wrapped around an apple and thrown through his window. See Smith, supra
note 10.
16.
Note:The Treason Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/publications/evidence/articles/note-treasontrial.htm.
17. Id. See generally I SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 333-36 (Burt Franklin 1973) (1883); 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 216, 217, 226-28 (1926); J.G. PHILLIMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 157 (1850).
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Raleigh"8 consisted of an ex parte affidavit, a letter, and hearsay on hearsay. 9
20
Within a quarter of an hour, Raleigh was convicted.
Even though English procedure at the time did not require the production
of witnesses or their examination in court,2' Sir Walter Raleigh demanded the
right to meet his accusers, a right recognized 1000 years earlier in secular and
ecclesiastical law. Because Raleigh was denied that right and quickly
sentenced to die, one of the four trial judges 23 later lamented that the trial had

"injured and degraded the justice of England. 24

18. Compare Raleigh's "witness" to the rights afforded by the Confrontation Clause. See
U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy ...the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him ...").
19. But cf FED. R. EvID. 805 (requiring each component of hearsay within hearsay to
conform to an exception). Recently, historians have begun to question America's romantic
version of Raleigh and his unfair trial. Uncovering so-called "untouched" documents from the
prosecution's case, Cambridge University archivist Mark Nicholls claims to have located proof
that Raleigh plotted to spy for Spain and to assist in a Spanish invasion of Britain. Rather than
being convicted unfairly, some contend that Raleigh's charm and wit overwhelmed the
prosecution.
20. Raleigh was later pardoned by the King, but was kept in the tower of London. There
he lived for thirteen years. His wife was allowed to visit privately and there conceived and gave
birth to their second son. During his time there, Sir Walter Raleigh authored three books
including History of the World. He befriended the King's wife and began tutoring her son, the
Prince of Wales, who reportedly stated that "none but my father would keep such a bird in a
cage." Smith, supra note 10, at pts. 15-16.
In 1615, when a proposed marriage between Prince Charles, the other son of King James
and Queen Anne, and the "Spanish Infanta" broke down, King James, desperate for money,
began to consider sending Raleigh on a gold-seeking voyage. In 1616, Sir Walter Raleigh was
released from the Tower in order to seek the gold that he believed could be found near the River
Orinoco. The voyage failed miserably. Raleigh lost his second-born son to battle, his long-time
friend to suicide, and his captains to desertion. When he arrived back in England, he was arrested
and eventually returned to the Tower. Id.
After his return, Raleigh was charged with additional offenses. Now, it was explained that
his treason was not pardonable and that he would be executed. A little more than two months
after his return, Sir Walter Raleigh was beheaded in the Old Palace Yard in Westminster. Id. at
pts. 17-19.
21. Witnesses did testify before juries in England by the time of the Raleigh trial, but
whether they were called to testify or testified by deposition was largely up to the prosecution.
See P.R. Glazebrook, The Reign ofMary Tudor, 1977 CRIM. L. REv. 582, 585.
22. See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 5, at 496-99 & nn.83-98.
23. Raleigh's trial judges included Sir John Popham, Chief Justice of the King's Bench;
Sir Edmund Anderson, Chief Justice of Common Pleas; and two prison judges, Sandys and
Warburton. Smith, supra note 10, at pt.15.
24. Id. One of the judges during the trial was cynical about Raleigh's demand for
Cobham's appearance: "My lord Cobham, perhaps, been laboured withal; and to save you, his
old friend, it may be that he will deny all that which he hath said." Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh,
2. T.B. Howell, at col. 18.
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B. The Right of ConfrontationPre-Raleigh
History contradicts the claim of many historians that the trial and
conviction of Sir Walter Raleigh was the impetus for the American
Confrontation Clause. In fact, the right of an accused to confront witnesses
existed centuries before the famous trial. 2' The roots of confrontation were in
the accusatorial system of justice, a system utilized by the Romans in the first
century. 26 Researchers verify the development in both secular and canon law,
with each being influenced by the desire to assure trustworthiness as well as
fairness in the proceedings.27
Confrontation rights first appeared in the codification of existing Roman
law by Emperor Justinian in 534.28 Among its many provisions were "time
limits" for examination of witnesses subpoenaed to testify. 29 Though the
provisions did not state explicitly that witnesses were required to testify in
person, the procedural provisions were based on that assumption. However,
five years later the Code was supplemented with Novel 90, a section on
witnesses in which their mandatory appearance was specified.3" The
prosecution's witnesses were required to appear in court in the presence of the
defendant and the factfinder.3" The precursor to the modem-day deposition was
provided for in civil cases in which witnesses could give their testimony in the
province where they lived. But the importance of in-person confrontation in
criminal cases was clear. Novel 90 stated that because of the "danger
concerning great things, by all means [in criminal cases] witnesses are to be
present [to testify] before the [fact-finder] judges. 32
An appreciation for the importance of confrontation was obvious in
ecclesiastical law. The church had patterned its dispute resolution practices
after the adversarial system of the courts. Among the disputes resolved in the
church were criminal disputes involving the violation of secular law by

25. See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 5, at 496-99.

26. Id. at 485-86.
27. The importance of fairness is explicit throughout the early proceedings. For example,
the Justinian Code noted that in criminal cases "in which there is danger concerning great things,

by all means witnesses are to be present [to testify] before the judges." Id. at 491 & n.59. An
early church writing explained the principle this way: "It is not just to make one-sided
judgments." Id. at 494 n.74. The story of Daniel and Susanna perhaps best explains the
relationship between confrontation and trustwortiness. See id. at 516-19 & nn. 190-93. Susanna
was about to be executed based on false accusations made by two elders. Daniel questioned the

two separately about a detail of the alleged adultery charge against Susanna and received
inconsistent answers. As a result, Susanna's condemnors were convinced that the elders were

lying. See Daniel 13:1-63.
28. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 5, at 490.
29. Id.
30. Id. at491.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 491 & n.59.
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clergy.33 In these proceedings, the church's criminal procedural rules mirrored
those of the state. 34 As early as the third century, the church evidenced
awareness of the unfairness of unconfronted accusations and alerted its judges
not to "hear only one person, with the other person not present and not
defending himself against the allegation."35
In its earliest form, the term "confrontation" referred to the right of an
accused to be present when the accuser testified. However, this notion
expanded to one in which the accused had a right to be present when any
witness against the accused testified.36 In the twelfth century, a procedure
developed by which judges took witnesses' testimony in secret, outside the
presence of other witnesses, and then had that testimony read. 37 The goal of this

procedure was to assure that one witness's testimony was not influenced by

3
another's, a problem that is today addressed by the sequestration rule. In order

to reconcile the new, secretive questioning procedure with that provided for in
early Roman law, the jurists interpreted the early law to require only that the
accused be present when the witness was sworn, but not necessarily when the
witness testified.39
This relaxation of the confrontation requirement in the twelfth century was
but a beginning. By the thirteenth century, a new emphasis on detection,
prosecution, and punishment for crime had evolved. Grave controversies in the
4
church led its leaders to seek a more expedient way to remove bad clergy.
Inquisitorial procedures replaced accusatorial ones and spread from the church
courts to the secular ones. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, witnesses

33. See id. at 493-94.
34. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 5, at 494.
35. Id. The official adoption of the state's rules on confrontation in civil matters occurred
in 603 when Pope Gregory I directed an investigation into the trial of a Spanish bishop and
specified, by quoting from Novel 90, that the investigator determine whether proof had been by
witnesses under oath with the accused present or in writing. Id. at 497. The church continued to
follow the Roman procedure even after the Roman Empire had fallen and the state had
succumbed to use of Germanic procedural rules. See id. at 499. For a lengthy and interesting
discussion of how the forgeries of legal texts by French clerics perpetuated the church's
procedure, see id. at 503-11.
36. See Herrmann & Speer, supranote 5, at 485,537-40. But see Herrmann & Speer, supra
note 5, at 537 ("For the prosecution of serious crimes, France by the mid-fifteenth century was
following a procedure extraordinaire,an inquisitional procedure stressing secrecy and torture.").
37. Id. at 515-16. Most attribute the popularity of this procedure to its biblical use by
Daniel during the trial of Susannah for adultery. Two elders, whose advances were rebuffed by
Susannah, accused her of adultery with a young man in an orchard. The two were interviewed
separately by Daniel and were asked the type of tree under which the adultery was committed.
Their differing answers convinced Daniel, and those determined to execute Susannah, that their
testimony was false. Id. at 516-17. Arguably, the story lends more support to the importance of
questioning accusers than to the use of secretive interrogations.
38. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 615 (federal rule for the exclusion of witnesses).
39. See Hermann & Speer, supra note 5, at 518-19 n. 198.
40. See id. at 523-24.
41. Id. at 526.
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and defendants were routinely interrogated by inquisition.42 While torture was
not allowed until a second examination (presuming the first did not obtain the
correct responses), it, too, became quite common.43
However, during this time period the words "confrontation" and "face-toface" crept into the language of the courts and the church." They were used to
describe the prerequisites to the inquisition and torture of a defendant.
Witnesses, who were secretively examined outside the defendant's presence
and without the defendant's knowledge, would be called to appear before the
defendant face-to-face where the defendant would "confront" (observe) them.4"
After the confrontation, if the reexamination of the witness (again, outside the
defendant's presence) produced the same information, the defendant could be
submitted to inquisition and torture to coerce a confession.' Thus, at the time
of Sir Walter Raleigh's trial, confrontation included face-to-face in-court
observation, but not examination in the accused's presence.
C. Ayrault's Vision
Fifteen years before Sir Walter Raleigh's trial, an early criminal scholar,
Pierre Ayrault, provided provoking commentary on criminal procedure in his
treatise Ordre.In contrasting the drastic differences between the protections in
place in Rome and in France at the end of the sixteenth century, Ayrault
criticized the justifications offered for abandoning many procedural
protections.47 As to the relaxation of confrontation rights, he noted:
And in truth it seems that it is natural and consequently
common to all men that the accused be heard; and that the
witnesses who are charging him be brought before him, to
sustain face to face the crime of which they are charging him,
in order that if he has something to say against them, he may
say it; and that the witnesses may see and recognize the
person about whom they are deposing. . . . [F]or the
interrogation [of a witness], to be good, [it] must be done
captiously and subtly; ... now in heat, now gently: which are
all matters for the adversary, . . . not the judge .... These
interrogations cannot be well suited to him who must be
neutral or impartial between the accuser and the
accused ....
[All trial proceedings in antiquity took place]

42. See id. at 532-37 (describing development of inquisition).
43. Id. at 532-33.

44. See id. at 539.
45. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 5, at 538-39.
46. See id. at 531. For a complete and gruesome description of the many methods of
torture, see DANIEL KATKIN, THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL LAW 242-52 (1982).
47. See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 5, at 540-41 (citations omitted).
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outdoors and in public, in the presence of the people, with all
the judges and the parties present ....

It is easy, behind

closed doors, to adjust or diminish [the evidence], to effect
intrigues or pressures. The audience, by contrast, is the rein
on the passions. It is the scourge of bad judges. 8
Ayrault's commentary previewed much of what the United States Supreme
Court would, at one time or another, assert as the essence of the right to
confrontation. To confront, a witness must be brought face-to-face with the
accused and questioned by one in a position adverse to the witness. The
questioning must also occur in public, in the presence of not only the accused
and the factfinder, but also the public "audience." 49
D. After Sir Walter Raleigh
1. English CriminalProcedureBefore the Revolution
Those who wed the Confrontation Clause to the trial, conviction, and
eventual execution of Sir Walter Raleigh claim that, as a result, Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights should reflect confrontation rights that existed
in England." Two aspects of English legal history significantly undermine this
proposition." The first is the infrequent appearance of counsel in English
courts. 2 The second is the drastic difference in the role of English judges and
juries and that of American judges and juries.53
In England in the 1600s, criminal defendants charged with serious offenses
had no right to counsel. For example, it was 1696 before those charged with
treason were granted the right to counsel. 4 Given the likely absence of counsel,

48. Id. at 541-43 (citations omitted).
49. See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 5, at 542-43.
50. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 63 (1899) (relying, in part, on English law); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325,
330 (1911) (citations omitted).
51. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 82-94 (describing English common law trials).
52. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 83 n.23 (citing Alexander Holtzhoff, The Right of
Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,2,4-6 (1944); John H. Langbein, The
Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 308 (1978)).
53. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 82-108 (describing systems); Stephen A. Landsman, The
Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 497, 513-14 (1990) (after the witness provided a narrative, the witness was
critically questioned by the judge; thus, "judicial interrogation of witnesses ... tended to
concentrate power in the court's hands .. "); Langbein, supra note 52, at 285, 315 (trial judge
examined the witnesses and the accused and dominated the proceedings; while the jury returned
a verdict, "the judge had no hesitation about telling the jury how it ought to decide").
54. The Treason Act, 1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § I (Eng.), attributed the grant of the right
to counsel in treason cases to "great abuses [that] took place at treason trials during the years
immediately preceding the Revolution of 1688." It is unlikely that the reference was to the
treason trial of Raleigh some eighty-five years earlier.
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judges interrogated the witnesses.55 The accused was generally expected to
testify, because without his speaking no defense was likely. Although juries
were used, they based their verdict on the judge's recitation of the evidence.
Thus, the forum itself was not conducive to confrontation.
However, by 1730, attorneys began to appear more regularly in the English
courts to represent parties and question witnesses.56 Once defense counsel
became available to question witnesses on the defendant's behalf, criminal
procedure and the trial process were dramatically altered. Lawyers honed their
cross-examination skills, defendants were able to present a defense without
testifying, and judges were able to play a more judicious role in the courts. The
presence of lawyers meant, of course, that evidence would be challenged.
Evidentiary challenges produced the need for rules of evidence.57 Still, it was
not until more than a decade after the adoption of the American Bill of Rights
that a complete adversary system developed in the English courts.
2. CriminalProcedurein Pre-Revolution America
The nineteenth-century arrival of an adversary system in England is
sufficient to lay to rest the most common misstatement about the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Americans did not adopt the Clause to
"secur[e] to every individual [the rights] he already possessed as a British
subject-such as his ancestors had inherited and defended since the days of
Magna Charta." 8 Any familiarity with the American Revolution and the
documents recording its development makes it certain that the settlers did not
intend to mimic the mother country's system of government. Instead they
created a system in which individual rights were recognized and respected and
in which governmental rights were circumscribed. The transgressions of the
King, enumerated in the American Declaration of Independence; the separation
of branches of government required by the Constitution; the reservation of
rights to the states outlined in that same document; and the individual liberties
set forth in the Bill of Rights establish without question that Americans would
not be limited to the rights they had as British subjects. In each instance, the
founders evidenced determination to limit the government's ability to reduce

55. Landsman, supra note 53, at 514; Langbein, supra note 52, at 285; see also J.M.
Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel andEnglish Criminal Trials in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries, 9 L. & HIST. REv. 221, 222 (1991) ("The judge acted as examiner and
cross-examiner .... ).
56. Jonakait, supra note 3, at 87-88.
57. Scholars differ as to when the rule excluding hearsay actually developed. Compare J.
WIGMORE, 5 WIGMOREON EVIDENCE § 1364 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (placing its origins
in the seventeenth century), with Langbein, supra note 52, at 301-06, andJohn H. Langbein, The
HistoricalOriginsofthe PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incriminationat Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.

1047, 1070 (1994) (arguing that hearsay evidence was used frequently well into the eighteenth
century).
58. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
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both the rights of individuals and of states.5 9 Government was to be feared, not
trusted, and the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights, in particular, were intended
to assure that government could not encroach upon certain fundamental
liberties.6
The presence of counsel in the courtroom helped impress upon the early
colonists the importance of the right to confrontation.6 ' Since counsel was more
prevalent in the 1600s and 1700s in the American colonies than in England,62
the importance of confrontation was more apparent. By the time the Bill of
Rights was crafted, then, the right to counsel was much more a recitation of
existing practice in the states than it was a respect for English common law.
Two uniquely American phenomena also suggest that confrontation was
more an American-born than an English-borrowed right. The use of public
prosecutors in most colonies (before that practice existed in England) boosted
the use of criminal defense lawyers because of the inherent unfairness of a
system in which only the government was represented.63 Perhaps more
important was the American distrust of judges who were seen as the
instruments of government, subject to the will of the King. In England, judges
They served, at
were appointed largely as a result of social or political status.64
65
pleasure.
King's
"the
at
Revolution,
Glorious
the
until
least
A system of a government prosecutor and a government judge pitted
against an unrepresented individual was unacceptable. This imbalance was one
of the primary reasons for the creation of an accusatorial, adversarial system of
justice.66 If lawyers represented the accused, those lawyers could serve as a

59. JOHN PHILIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 50 (1986).
60.
"The American Revolution altered the relationships between people and
[A] cultural climate evolved that generally
authority . . . .
Empowered by their belief in the ideals of democratic representation
distrusted... authority ....
and individual rights, people . ..entered into a national debate over the organization and
application of authority." DANIEL E. WILLIAMS, PILLARS OF SALT: AN ANTHOLOGY OF EARLY
AMERICAN CRIMINAL NARRATIVES 20 (1993).
61. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 88.
62. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause:An Alternate History,
27 RUTGERS L. REV. 77,95 (1995). Rhode Island, for example, allowed counsel as early as 1660,
and Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia were all seeing counsel as regularly
in the 1750s as was the mother country.
63. The first public prosecutor's office in America was created in Connecticut in 1704,
Jonakait, supra note 3, at 88 n.105, while victims continued to act as prosecutors in England at
around the same time, id. at 82 n.22. Jonakait notes that "[i]n America, . . . where advocates
increasingly presented the prosecution's case, the unjustness of the defense counsel prohibition
must have been apparent." Id. at 99.
64. Id. at 103-04.
65. One of the paragraphs of the American Declaration of Independence that set forth the
complaints with the King read: "He has made judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure
of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. II (U.S. 1776). This complaint ultimately led to the creation of life-tenured
federal judges.
66. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 105.
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check on the otherwise unbalanced system-a check on government
prosecutors, untrusted judges, and government in general.
3. Causes ofRevolution and the Confrontation Clause
Among the many British acts that prompted the call for American
independence was the Stamp Act of 1765. While the colonists certainly
opposed the taxation imposed by the Act, its "most grievous innovation"67 was
its grant ofjurisdiction for breaches of the Act to nonjury courts of admiralty.6"
The British attempted similar encroachments into the right to trial by jury in a
parliamentary resolution that followed the Stamp Act. 69 These and other acts
served to increase the commitment in the new country to protect the right to a
jury trial and all its penumbras.70
4. Confrontation Under State Constitutions
Despite the general agreement that confrontation rights have ambiguous
beginnings and that no history of the Clause can be proclaimed with certainty,
it is without question that the language ultimately used in the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause was derived from state constitutions.7 1 For example,
Section 8 of Virginia's 1776 Bill of Rights provided that "in all capital or
criminal prosecutions a man hath a right... to be confronted with the accusers
and witnesses ....
In the next eight years, seven states included similar Confrontation Clauses
in their constitutions. 73 All seven of these state constitutions predated the
American Bill of Rights. For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution provided
that the accused had the right to "be confronted with the witnesses," Delaware
provided for the right "to be confronted with the accusers or witnesses," and
Massachusetts and New Hampshire provided that the accused had the right "to

67. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 57 (3d ed. 1943). John Adams used these words
to describe the British displacement of the right to a jury trial.
68. Id.; Larkin, supra note 3,at 71.
69. R. FROTHINGHAM, THE RISE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 231-32 (7th ed.
1899). The Act of Parliament provided that all "traitors" in the colonies would be taken to

England and tried for treason, thereby denying the accused the right to be tried by ajury selected
from the locality of the alleged crime and the right to call witnesses in their own defense. Id.
70. See Larkin, supra note 3, at 71-73.

71. Likewise, the states that adopted constitutions after the adoption of the Bill of Rights
largely modeled their constitutions after the prior state constitutions on which the Bill of Rights
relied.

72. Larkin, supra note 3, at 75 (citing 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3812-19 (F. Thorpe ed., 1909)). The June 29,

1776 Constitution of Virginia is part of the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School and can be

viewed at http://www.yale.edu.lawweb/avalon/states/va05.htm.
73. Larkin, supranote 3, at 75-76 (citing SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES chs. 23-29 (R. Perry
& J. Cooper eds., 1859) [hereinafter SOURCES]).
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74
meet the witnesses against him face to face." Only North Carolina's

Constitution varied significantly by providing that the accused had the right "to
5
confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony.""

Every state that adopted a constitution prior to the adoption of the federal
Constitution and the subsequent ratification of the Bill of Rights included
provisions guaranteeing confrontation rights.76 The most likely source of these
constitutional provisions was Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England,77 which was published from 1765-1769 and very influential in the
colonies." On the subject of confrontation, Blackstone commented:
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of
truth, than the private and secret examination taken down in
writing before an officer, or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical
courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from
the civil law: where a witness may frequently depose that in
private, which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and
Besides, the occasional questions of the
solemn tribunal ....
judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses
on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal
set of interrogatories previously penned and settled: and the
confronting of adverse witnesses is also another opportunity
of obtaining a clear discovery, which can never be had upon
any other method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge,
during the examination, a matter of small importance: for,
besides the respect and awe with which his presence will
naturally inspire the witness, he is able by use and experience
to keep the evidence from wandering from the point in issue.
In short by this method of examination, and this only, the
persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an
opportunity of observing the quality, age, education,
understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in
which points all persons must appear alike, when their
depositions are reduced to writing, and read to the judge, in

74. Id.
75. Larkin, supra note 3, at 76.
76. The amendments which would become the Bill of Rights were introduced on June 8,

1789. The Sixth Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791. Id. at 76.
77. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
78. Larkin, supra note 3, at 72. ("These volumes were avidly sought in the colonies and
had inestimable impact there on the development and growth of the law and legal attitudes.").
One author has noted that within the Virginia Constitution upon which many of the other state
constitutions were based, could be gleaned expressions "from Sydney, from Locke, and from
Burgh... [but] the diction, the design, the thoughts are all [those of George Mason]." Id. at 75
n.30 (citation omitted).
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the absence of those who made them: and yet as much may
be frequently collected from the manner in which the
79
evidence is delivered, as from the matter of it.
The state courts were required to interpret the language of state
confrontation clauses long before the United States Supreme Court had to apply
its language. Courts in Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee all issued
opinions on the nature of confrontation rights before the United States Supreme
Court spoke as a body on the issue.8"
E. The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
Those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights had contributed a decade
earlier to the drafting of state constitutions."1 They had observed the
development of the American adversary system, complete with counsel,
confrontation, and compulsory process. They had witnessed the attempts of
England to interfere with those rights by removing the accused to England for
trial. It is no surprise, then, that the draft of the Bill of Rights included those
three guarantees to counsel, to confrontation, and to compulsory process, in
what would become the Sixth Amendment.82
When James Madison introduced the Sixth Amendment it contained
substantially the same language as that used in the Virginia Constitution.
Precisely, the Amendment provided that an accused had the right to be
confronted "with his accusers, and the witnesses against him."83 After one
revision deleting the words "his accusers," the Amendment passed.
III. CASES IN WHICH CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ISSUES ARISE

Cases that raise Confrontation Clause issues generally fall within one of
four categories. Throughout this Article, cases will be referred to by reference
to one of the following four categories:84 hearsay cases, Bruton cases,
protective devices cases, or cross-examination cases.

79. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at 373-74.

80. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807); State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (I
Hayw.) 77 (1794); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229 (1807).

81. See Larkin, supra note 3, at 72-78 (providing background).
82. Originally, the Bill of Rights consisted of twelve amendments with the first two
preceding what would become the First and Second Amendments.
83. See Larkin, supra note 3, at 76 (citing SOURCES, supra note 73, at 423).
84. The Court applied the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to the states on the
same day in 1965 in Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) and Douglasv. Alabama, 380
U.S.
415 (1965). Nothing in the decisions suggests that analysis under the Confrontation Clause
changed as a result of its application to the states. Thus, this Article does not differentiate
between federal cases analyzing the clause and state cases analyzing the clause via
the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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Case Types
1. ExtrajudicialStatements

A large number of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause cases have
involved the introduction at trial of extrajudicial statements. The phrase
"extrajudicial statement" is used in this Article to refer to all out-of-court
statements made by a declarant and offered in court. Throughout the Article,
"declarant" will be used as it is used in the Federal Rules of Evidence to refer
85
to the maker of a statement sought to be introduced at trial.
86
Extrajudicial statements include statements that are hearsay, statements
that are not hearsay, 7 statements that satisfy exceptions to the hearsay
rule,8 8 and statements that are defined by modem rules of evidence as
nonhearsay."9

85. "Declarant" is defined under the federal rules as "a person who makes a statement."
FED. R. EVID. 801 (b).
86. The Federal Rules of Evidence define "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
87. Statements that are "not hearsay" refer to those extrajudicial statements that do not fall
within the hearsay definition. Common examples ofextrajudicial statements that are not hearsay
are statements that are offered to prove something other than the truth of the statement, such as
the effect on the listener, notice, or knowledge.
88. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, exceptions may apply in the event of the
unavailability of the declarant, FED. R. EvID. 804, regardless of the availability of the declarant,
FED. R. EVID. 803, or in either situation, FED. R. EVID. 807. Exceptions that exist only upon a
showing of the unavailability of the hearsay declarant are: former testimony, statements under
belief of impending death, statements against interest, statements of personal or family history,
and forfeiture by wrongdoing. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(l)-(6). Exceptions that apply regardless of
the availability of the declarant are: present sense impression; excited utterance; then-existing
mental, emotional, or physical condition; statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment; recorded recollection; records of regularly conducted activity or absence of such a
record; public records and reports or absence of such a record or report; records ofvital statistics;
records of religious organizations; marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates; family records;
records of documents affecting an interest in property; statements in documents affecting an
interest in property; statements in ancient documents; market reports and commercial
publications; learned treatises; reputation concerning personal or family history; reputation
concerning boundaries or general history; reputation as to character; judgment of previous
conviction; andjudgment as to personal, family, or general history or boundaries. FED. R. EVID.
803 (1)-(23). Rule 807 provides for a general exception to the hearsay rule, known as the
residual exception, in unique circumstances. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
89. Under the federal rules, four kinds of statements are defined as nonhearsay. They are
prior inconsistent statements under oath (offered when the declarant is present, testifying, and
subject to cross-examination); prior consistent statements (when offered to rebut a claim of
recent fabrication, improper influence, or motive); prior statements of identification (made by
one after perceiving the person identified); and statements of a party opponent offered against
the party in either an individual, adopted, representative, agency, or co-conspirator capacity. See
FED. R. EVID. 801 (d).
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An extrajudicial statement impacts an accused's Confrontation Clause
rights only when it is offered by the government in a criminal case to prove an
element of the government's case or to rebut an element of the defendant's
case.90 Throughout this Article, extrajudicial statement cases refer jointly to
hearsay and Bruton cases described below.
a. Hearsay Cases
The category of cases referred to in this Article as hearsay cases are those
cases in which the government has introduced extrajudicial statements in court
to prove an element of the government's case or to rebut an element of the
defendant's case. In hearsay cases, the government introduces the statement in
its case in chief without producing the declarant, either arguing that the
statement satisfies an exception to the hearsay rule, is not hearsay, or is
nonhearsay as defined under rules of evidence.
b. Bruton Cases
One common type of hearsay case is one in which the declarant, the maker
of the extrajudicial statement, is a criminal defendant tried jointly with another
defendant. In these cases, referred to in this Article as Bruton cases, the
government seeks to introduce the hearsay statement of the declarant (referred
to in Bruton cases as the codefendant) in the joint trial. The hearsay statement
may be admissible against its maker, the codefendant, either because it is
nonhearsay or because it satisfies a hearsay exception, but it is generally not
admissible against the defendant. The situation is complicated by the
constitutional protections applicable to the codefendant declarant that are not
present in other hearsay cases.9' Because of these distinctions, the Court has
handled Bruton cases differently, and they merit separate classification.
2. In-CourtStatements
Confrontation Clause issues do not always arise as a result of an
extrajudicial statement. In two kinds of cases, the issue is confrontation not of
an out-of-court statement but of an in-court statement. These two kinds of
confrontation cases are those involving protective devices and those in which
cross-examination is in some way limited. They will be referred to collectively
as in-court statements.

90. For example, if the government relies upon an extrajudicial statement to impeach, or
for some purpose other than the truth of the statement, the extrajudicial statement would not
impact Confrontation Clause fights. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 417 (1985).
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (asserting the foremost of these protections: the privilege
against self-incrimination).
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a. ProtectiveDevices Cases
The third category of cases will be referred to as protective devices cases.
This category includes cases in which the government places some protective
barrier between the defendant and the testifying witness. In these cases, the
government asserts some governmental interest which justifies isolating the
witness, usually the victim, from the physical presence of the defendant during
the trial testimony. Unlike the two varieties of extrajudicial statement cases, in
these cases the witness actually testifies at trial. The most frequently used
92
protective devices are closed-circuit televisions, screens, and videotaping.
b.

Cross-ExaminationCases

The fourth category of cases will be referred to as cross-examination cases.
In these cases, the defendant's ability to cross-examine a witness, who is
testifying at trial, is limited in some manner. The declarant actually testifies as
a witness at trial, unlike in the extrajudicial statement cases, and in the
defendant's view, unlike in the protective devices cases. However, in the
defendant's opinion the witness is not subject to full and fair crossexamination.
B.

The Supreme Court's Chronology of Confrontation Clause Cases

1. Summary of Chronology
Reviewing the major Supreme Court confrontation cases in chronological
order offers some insight into the Court's varied interpretations of the Clause.
Beginning in 1895"3 and continuing until 1965, the Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence was limited to hearsay cases. In 1965, the Court
considered a series of cross-examination cases arising out of unusual, and

92. For commentary on protective device cases, see Jean Montoya, On Truth andShielding
in ChildAbuse Cases,43 HASTINGs L.J. 1259 (1992); Janet Leach Richards, Protectingthe Child
Witness in Abuse Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 393 (2000); Kathleen A. Barry, Comment, Witness Shield
Laws and ChildSexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Presumption of Guilt, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 99, 11519 (1990); Katherine A. Frances, Note, To Hide in Plain Sight: Child Abuse, Closed Circuit
Television, and the Confrontation Clause, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 827 (1992).

93. In 1851, the Supreme Court decided a case that it considered a Confrontation Clause
case. In United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851), the defendant was jointly indicted,

but tried separately for murder. In his defense, defendant Reid proposed to call the codefendant,
Clements, to testify. The trial court would not allow Reid to call Clements, deeming him
incompetent as a witness because he was jointly indicted. Reid was convicted and appealed,
asserting his right to call the witness. Chief Justice Taney, writing for the Court, upheld the trial
court's denial of Reid's claimed right to call the witness. Id. at 361, 366-67. The language of the
Court's decision would figure prominently in the Court's early Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, though the case itself would rarely be cited. See discussion infra Part III.
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hopefully unlikely to be repeated, factual situations. 94 In 1968, the Court began
what would be a difficult foray into Bruton cases, beginning with the Bruton
decision itself. With the exception of five cross-examination cases issued in
1974 and from 1985-87, the Court focused exclusively on the development of
its hearsay and confrontation jurisprudence for the twenty years after Bruton.
Then, in 1987, the Court returned to the Bruton cases before tackling a new
category of cases-the protective devices cases. These cases arose as a result
of defense challenges to state statutes passed largely to protect child witnesses.
In the last decade, the Court has again focused on hearsay cases, with the
exception of one Bruton case decided in 1998.
a. The FirstSeventy Years - Hearsay Cases, PartI
The first seventy years of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
decisions involved hearsay cases. Beginning with Mattox v. UnitedStates95 and
continuing until Pointerv. Texas,96 the Court analyzed whether the admission
of hearsay statements at trial violated the Constitution. For example, Mattox
was a case involving a retrial. At the first trial, two witnesses testified and were
subject to full cross-examination. The accused challenged his conviction, which
had been partially based on the court reporter's notes of testimony. Two of the
prosecution's witnesses, who were said to be "the strongest proof against the
accused," died between the first prosecution and conviction of the defendant
and the retrial following the defendant's successful appeal. 97 At the second trial,
the reporter's stenographic notes of the dead witnesses testimony were admitted
over defense objection, but evidence that one of the witness's recanted his
incriminating testimony was disallowed.9"

94. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
95. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). See supra note 93 for discussion of United States v. Reid which
predated Mattox.

96. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
97. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240.
98. The Court excluded the testimony of two witnesses who claimed that one of the
deceased declarants recanted his testimony incriminating Maddox and confessed that he was

forced to testify falsely. The Court affirmed on grounds that because the deceased witness could

not be confronted with the inconsistent statement, a proper foundation could not be laid for its
admission. See id. at 250. Three Justices dissented from the decision on this aspect of the case.

Id. at 250, 260-61 (Shiras, Gray, & White, J.J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices stated:
According to the rulings of the court below, the death of the witness

deprived the accused of the opportunity of cross-examining him as to his
conflicting statements, and the loss of this opportunity of crossexamination deprived the accused of the right to impeach the witness by
independent proof of those statements; and thus, while the death of the
witness did not deprive the government of the benefit of his testimony
against the accused, it did deprive the latter of the right to prove that the

testimony of the witness was untrustworthy.
Id. Today this problem would be avoided by Federal Rules of Evidence 806 and 613. See infra
note 104.
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The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's ruling allowing the
prosecution's introduction of the deceased witnesses' former testimony.
Court's analysis and rationale, not its conclusion, are what is most instructive.
According to the Court, the only authority for the defense's proposition that the
testimony should be excluded derived from a misstatement in a work on
evidence. That treatise specifically stated that "the testimony of a deceased
witness could not be used in a criminal prosecution."99 The Court quickly

°
pointed out that the case on which the treatise relied,' as well as the rule in

England"0 ' and in the states,102 clearly allowed prior testimony of a deceased
witness. Notwithstanding the constitutional right to confrontation, the Court
concluded that rules of law, "however beneficent in their operation and

valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case."'0 3

The Mattox decision constituted the

initial, unfortunate misjoinder of evidence principles with the constitutional
right to confrontation. More than one-half of the relevant portions of the
Court's opinion reviewed rules of evidence in England and the states,' finding
that the overwhelming majority allowed the admission of testimony "where the
defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before
a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case . . .. ""'
However, the Court did not add that even the strictest reading of the
Confrontation Clause allowed the introduction of this testimony-testimony
given under oath and subject to cross-examination in a prior proceeding by a

99. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240.
100. The English case relied upon by Peake was reported to be case of SirJohn Fenwick,
13 How. St. Tr. 537, 579 (1696), a treason case in which the absent witness testified against
someone other than the defendant in a previous trial, but who was not deceased and had never
testified against, nor been subject to cross-examination by, John Fenwick. Mattox, 156 U.S. at
240.
101. The Court matter-of-factly stated that "[t]he rule in England... is clearly the other
way." Id.
102. The Court cited cases from Virginia, Tennessee, California, Massachusetts, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Missouri, Mississippi, Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, Alabama, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, Georgia, and Louisiana. Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 243. In the most unfortunate phrase in the Mattox decision, the Court continued:
"The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in
order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused." Id. (emphasis added). It is
noteworthy that what had been "essential to the correct administration of justice" in 1807, and
among the "safeguards ...which were so oppressive and odious" in 1851, had become "an
incidental benefit" by 1895.
104. See id. at 240-50. In addition to the confrontation issue, the defendant challenged the
trial court's refusal to allow him to impeach one of the deceased witnesses with testimony. The
Court upheld the trial court's ruling based upon the common-law requirement that a witness must
be asked whether an inconsistent statement was made before the inconsistent statement could
be introduced. See id. at 245-50. This portion of the holding has been repudiated in most state
and federal courts by the inclusion of Rule 806 that allows the impeachment of hearsay
declarants, and by Rule 613 that removes the need to first confront the witness with the prior
inconsistent statement. See FED. R. EVID. 806, 613.
105. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 241.
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witness who was now unequivocally unavailable. Instead, the Court
gratuitously added that prior testimony given before a committing magistrate,
where the accused was not present, would be admissible at trial if the witness
was unavailable. 0 6 This dicta was unnecessary and confusing.
The Court's dicta and its joinder of constitutional rights with evidence
principles were most unfortunate. After its observations, the Court contrasted
the English practice of trial based upon ex parte depositions or affidavits with
the American practice of in-court confrontation. Ex parte affidavits could not
be used
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of
the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only
of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.'0 7
This was the United States Supreme Court's first complete formulation of the
purposes of the rights secured under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause. 8
The Mattox dicta previewed an interpretive device that the Court would
employ when faced with future Confrontation Clause challenges. The Court
noted that "technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may
occasionally be carried further than is necessary . *..."'0
Thus, a test that
balances the benefits against the burdens would be used to determine if strict
adherence to evidence principles were required by the constitutional right to
confrontation.
Illustrating appropriate balance, the Court suggested that "no one" could
question the admissibility of a dying declaration," 0 although its admission
directly conflicted with the right of confrontation.
They are rarely made in the presence of the accused; they are
made without any opportunity for examination or crossexamination; nor is the witness brought face to face with the
jury; yet from time immemorial they have been treated as
competent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood

106. Id.

107. Id. at 242-43.
108. This formulation by the Court was not attributed to any source. Yet, earlier state court
decisions had identified and discussed many of these purposes.

109. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
110. Id. at 243-44. Notably, Mattox was not a case involving dying declarations, although
some future cases would refer to it as such.

2003]

RESCUING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

at this day to question their admissibility. They are
admitted... simply from the necessities of the case, and to
prevent a manifest failure of justice [and because of their
inherent reliability]."1
This dicta would be the predecessor of the Court's "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" and "indicia of reliability" approaches which appeared in the next
century.112
The remainder of the Court's first thorough interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause was equally disconcerting. Without any citation, the
Court connected the Clause with the desire to avoid trial by deposition or by ex
parte affidavit, as was common in civil cases in England." 3 While the Mattox
Court supplemented this limiting approach by reciting multiple reasons for
confrontation, the Court would frequently use this connection between
confrontation and unacceptable English practices to limit the right to
confrontation.
The second aspect of the Mattox decision that would be revived repeatedly
to limit confrontation rights was its use of a benefits-burden analysis. Although
the Court acknowledged that the literal language of the Confrontation Clause
supported an absolute right to confrontation, it quickly added that "[t]he law in
its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed
in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused."' 14Clearly,
in Mattox, the benefit was incidental, because the accused in the previous trial
had confronted the witnesses who were now silenced by death. Unfortunately,
the Court did not later confine the benefit-burden analysis to cases in which the
benefit was so incidental.
Had the Court in later decisions latched on to other parts of the Mattox
opinion, the appreciation for confrontation rights might have been different. At
least four times the Court asserted that Mattox had enjoyed the full opportunity
to confront the now-deceased witnesses at the former trial. That, the Court

111. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44. The paraphrased portion of the quote replaces the Court's
reference to its prior opinion in which the Chief Justice had commented that impending death
"is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood." Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
112. See infra notes 206-242 and accompanying text.
113. The Court stated:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted
in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he
is worthy of belief.
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43.
114. Id. at 243.
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asserted, was a right that the accused "shall under no circumstances be deprived
of ...

. 115

The Mattox decision made the Court's resolution of the confrontation issue
in Kirby v. United States"6 four years later quite simple. Kirby had not
confronted the "witness" against him. The "witness against" Kirby was the
judgment of conviction in another case used to prove that property Kirby
possessed was stolen." 7 The Kirby Court captured the significance of
confrontation in its analysis:
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses
cannot be proved against an accused.., except by witnesses
who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while
being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose
testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the
established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal
8
cases. 11

While the Kirby Court followed the Mattox Court's lead in utilizing rules

of evidence to analyze the case before it,'

9

it took care to point out the

supremacy of constitutional principles. Thus, the Kirby decision emphasized

the nexus between the Confrontation Clause, the adversary system, the
presumption of innocence, and due process. 2 ° The legislature could not

generate evidence rules that would "impair the very substance of a right long

deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it [was
guarded by state and federal constitutions].''
It would be more than six decades before the Court again addressed a
significant Confrontation Clause issue. 122 I n Douglasv. Alabama,2 23 Pointerv.

115. Id. at 244. So confident was the Court of the absolute right to confront at some time
that it painstakingly set forth the requirement that the actual transcript of the prior testimony be
proven by oath of the stenographer. Id.
116. 174 U.S. 47(1899).
117. Id. at 49-50.
118. Id. at 55. Though not quoted or cited, this is substantially the language used by the
Mattox Court. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
119. See Kirby, 174 U.S. at 56-61 (citing numerous cases and evidence treatises that
discussed the method of proving that goods were stolen for purposes of convicting the person
for possession of the goods). Kirby is most likely the reason that Mattox is frequently miscited
as a dying declaration case. See id. at 61.
120. See id. at 55-56 (reasoning a "vital fact which the Government was bound to establish
affirmatively [was put into evidence] by reason alone of what appeared to have been said in
another criminal prosecution with which [Kirby] was not connected and at which he was not
entitled to be represented").
121. Id. at 56.
122. Between 1899 and 1965, the Court decided four cases which referred to the
Confrontation Clause. In Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), the Court disallowed the
use of a witness statement when it was found that the witness's absence was due to the
negligence of the government's agents. In West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904), overruledby
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Texas, 24 and Barber v. Page12 the Court found Confrontation Clause
violations based upon the State's introduction of hearsay to prove elements of
its cases."'
The Court used the Pointer case to make the Sixth Amendment's
confrontation guarantees applicable to the states. At Pointer's trial, the State
offered the transcript of his preliminary hearing at which he was not
represented by counsel. At the preliminary hearing, the victim testified that he
was robbed by Pointer and a codefendant. Since then, the State claimed, the
victim had left Texas. 2 7 From the opening paragraphs, it was clear that the
Supreme Court considered the right of confrontation to have fundamental
underpinnings. The Court noted that:
It cannot be seriously doubted at this late date that the
right of cross-examination is included in the right of an
accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against
him. And probably no one.., would deny the value of crossexamination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth
in the trial of a criminal case. The fact that this right appears
in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the
belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that
confrontation was a fundamental
right essential to a fair trial
28
in a criminal prosecution.1
In Douglas,the Court reversed an Alabama trial court's ruling that allowed
the state to cross-examine a witness based on the witness's alleged confession
that implicated the defendant. The witness had been convicted of the offense,
but refused to testify when called to the witness stand. While attempting to
cross-examine the witness, the prosecution read each line of the witness's
confession prefaced with questions such as, "[did] you say ...?" and "[d]id

Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court upheld the judgment of a Louisiana trial court
that allowed the use of former testimony taken at the preliminary examination when the witness
was unable to be produced for trial. In Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), the Court
allowed the use of documentary evidence to prove a collateral fact in a criminal case. In Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934), the Court emphasized the right of the accused "to
be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the
fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge."
123. 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (decided April 5, 1965).
124. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (decided April 5, 1965).
125. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
126. The history of the Confrontation Clause might have been better served if the Court
had decided these cases on different grounds. For example, Douglas could easily have been
disposed of under a sufficiency of the evidence analysis. Pointerwas largely a right to counsel
case. Barber was a case about the State's failure to produce its witnesses.
127. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401.
128. Id. at 404 (citations omitted).
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you make your further statement... ?""' Although the trial judge instructed
the jury that the questions were not evidence, the Supreme Court held that "[iun
the circumstances of this case, [Douglas'] inability to cross-examine [the
witness] as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of crossexamination secured by the Confrontation Clause."' 30

The testimony offered in Barber was that of a codefendant who had
testified at the preliminary hearing, but was, by the time of trial, incarcerated
in a federal prison some 225 miles away from the site of the trial. The Court
began its analysis of the Confrontation Clause issue by acknowledging that the
"State made absolutely no effort to obtain the presence of [the witness] at
trial ....

The Court then demonstrated the importance of the right by noting that it
could not be dishonored simply out of need or for convenience sake. Only
when the prosecution made a good-faith effort to obtain a witness's presence
32
at trial and failed could the absent witness's former testimony be introduced.
In light of the State's failure to do so, the Court added that even had counsel
cross-examined the witness at the preliminary hearing, the introduction of the
former preliminary hearing testimony at trial would have violated the
Confrontation Clause.133
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It
includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the
occasionfor thejury to weigh the demeanor ofthe witness. A

preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching
exploration into the merits of a case than a trial .... While
there may be some justification for holding that the
opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a
preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation
clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable,
this is not ... such a case. 3 '

129. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 416-18 & n.3.
130. Id. at419.
131. Barber,390 U.S. at 720, 723.
132. Id. at 724-25. The Court corrected that "various courts and commentators have
heretofore assumed that the mere absence of a witness from the jurisdiction was sufficient
ground for dispensing with confrontation on the theory that... the trial Court [could not compel
the witness's attendance.]" Id. at 723 (citations omitted). This "theory" had little "continuing
validity in the criminal law" as a result of federal statues and uniform laws that provide means
for procuring the attendance of out-of-jurisdiction witnesses. Id.
133. Id. at 725.
134. Id. at 725-26 (emphasis added).
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b. Cross-ExaminationCases (1965, 1966, 1968)
In four aberrational cases, 135 arising shortly after the Court began its
modem Confrontation Clause analysis in hearsay cases, the Court applied the
Clause in a second kind of case, which dealt with limitations on crossexamination. The hearsay cases noted the connection between the right of
cross-examination and the right to confrontation. But no case up to this time
had suggested that cross-examination was the sole right protected by the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Perhaps that was because all of the prior
cases in which a confrontation violation was found involved absent witnesses.
None of the previous cases involved a witness who was present, yet not
required to undergo cross-examination. The four cross-examination cases
allowed the Court to consider whether confrontation was violated by the
introduction of testimony not subject to cross-examination1 3and,
eventually,
6
whether limits on cross-examination violated confrontation.
The first cross-examination cases, like the first three modem-day hearsay
cases, could have easily been decided on grounds other than confrontation. Yet
in each of them, the Court addressed confrontation in ways that became part of
the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. In Turner and Parker,law
enforcement officers, whose sworn duty it was to keep the jury from
inappropriate outside influences, arguably exerted such influences themselves
by making statements, outside the courtroom, that implied the defendant's
guilt.137 In both cases, the Court reversed convictions because evidence against
an accused must "come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where
there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of
cross-examination, and of counsel." '

135. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966)
(per curiam); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1(1966); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129(1968). Three
other cases might be added here, but are not considered fully because of the other bases for the
decisions. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), dealt with the right of a defendant to
impeach his or her own witness in a criminal case, related to, but not explicitly a Confrontation
Clause issue. Both McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), and Rovario v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957), dealt with the defendant's desire to discover the name of a criminal informant
prior to or during the trial. While both decisions referred to the right to discover the information
as related to confrontation, the cases turned on the proposition that confrontation is a trial right.
136. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985);
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). The
case of Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), is also properly categorized as a crossexamination case, though it has some of the elements of the protective devices cases.
137. See Turner, 379 U.S. at 467-68. Turner involved two deputy sheriffs who were both
prime witnesses against the accused and the guardians of the jury. Allowing them to guard the
jury was error because evidence against the accused was required to "come from the witness
stand." Id. at 473. Parker involved a court bailiff assigned to guard the sequestered jury who
commented on the defendant's guilt to ajuror "in the presence of' other jurors. 385 U.S. at 363
("Oh that wicked fellow .. , he is guilty .... ).
138. Parker,385 U.S at 364 (quoting Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73).
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In the third case, Brookhartv. Janis,139 the defendant claimed a complete
denial of the right to confront any witnesses, including a codefendant who had
allegedly confessed. 40 The Court noted: "If there was here a denial of crossexamination without waiver, it would be constitutional error of the first
magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.' 4'

Smith v. Illinois'42 was an equally simple case reversing a trial court's
refusal to allow defense counsel to ask the "real name" of the falsely-identified
witness. 43 The Court relied on an earlier decision to bolster its commentary on
the essential right to cross-examine:
It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given
the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the
court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might
develop. Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to
place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of
his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the
jury cannot fairly appraise them.... To say that prejudice
can be established only by showing that the crossexamination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out
facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a
substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential
to a fair trial.'"
This view of the fundamental nature of cross-examination would suffer a setback in the Court's next cross-examination cases.
c.

Bruton Cases (1968-1969)

Fresh from asserting the importance of cross-examination to confrontation,
the Court again emphasized that aspect of the right in a series of cases
involving the introduction of a codefendant's confession at ajoint trial. A slight

foreshadowing of this unique problem had occurred in Brookhart."41 It is of

139. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
140. Brookhart was, in reality, a waiver case. Counsel for the accused, but not the accused,
had agreed to an Ohio procedure known as a prima facie case in which the defendant, in effect,
requires the State to prove guilt but does not challenge the State's evidence. Id. at 6-7.
141. Id. at3.
142. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
143. Id. at 130.
144. Id. at 132 (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)).
145. The Court said in Brookhart that unless waiver of the right to cross-examine was
established, the defendant was denied his constitutional rights in two ways. 384 U.S. at 4. The
first was by virtue of having been denied the right to cross-examine any witness. Id. The second
was by virtue of the state having introduced "as evidence against him an alleged confession,
made out of court by one of his codefendants, Mitchell, who did not testify in court, and
petitioner was therefore denied any opportunity whatever to confront and cross-examine the
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particular interest that the Court split the confrontation issues in Brookhart in
two, separating the denial of the right to confront and cross-examine any
witness from the same rights with regard to a confessing codefendant.
InBruton v. UnitedStates'.. and the many cases in which the Court refined
the Bruton rule, the Court identified the codefendant's right to remain silent as
the constitutional basis for this delineation. This delineation was the likely
beginning of the Court's tendency in later decisions to greatly reduce
confrontation rights in hearsay cases, while preserving them in Bruton cases.'4 7
The constitutional requirement that justified strict control over the
admission, injoint trials, ofcodefendants' statements was the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court in Bruton adopted the
explanation given by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: "'A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission in evidence
against a codefendant of a statement or confession made by that codefendant.
This prejudice cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the codefendant
does not take the stand ....

Very little was said in Bruton about the Confrontation Clause, but what
was said furthered the Court's joinder of the right of confrontation with crossexamination. Before beginning the main thrust of the opinion, which justified
overruling prior precedent,' 49 the Court acknowledged Pointerand Douglas,
the first two modem hearsay cases, and the nexus between confrontation and
cross-examination. However, the Court did not equate the two, noting that
cross-examination was "included in the right of an accused in a criminal case
to confront the witnesses against him" and that "'a major reason underlying the
constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with crime an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.""50 Bruton was denied
his confrontation rights because the government introduced evidence that
"added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to [its] case in a form not
subject to cross-examination."'' In its sole reference to evidence rules, so
detailed in earlier decisions, the Bruton Court noted in a footnote that the

witness who made this very damaging statement." Id.
146. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
147. See infra notes 161-278 and accompanying text.
148. 391 U.S. at 132 (quoting 34 F.R.D. 411,419 (1964)).
149. In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 233 (1957), overruled by Bruton v.

United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court had upheld the introduction of a codefendant's
inculpating confession at a joint trial at which the jury was instructed as to the limited use of the
codefendant's confession. In Bruton, the Court held that "because of the substantial risk that the

jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in
determining petitioner's guilt, admission of [the codefendant] Evans's confession in this joint
trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment." 391 U.S. at 126.
150. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 406-07).
151. Id. at 127-28.
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codefendant's confession was "clearly inadmissible" against Bruton under
evidence rules. 52
'
Two aspects of the Bruton analysis are relevant to this historical
discussion. First, the Court stressed the critical nature of the evidence which
had been allowed-the codefendant's confession. The evidence was referred
to as "devastating to the defendant" and considered critical to the prosecution's
case.' This reference would provide a new dimension for the Confrontation
Clause inquiry,
evidenced in one of the Court's next hearsay cases, Dutton v.
54
Evans.1
Second was Bruton's implicit, albeit somewhat ambiguous, focus on what
this Article will refer to as the "functional view" of the Confrontation Clause.
A codefendant's confession was "inevitably suspect" as to the defendant
(though, as the Court would later advise, inherently reliable as to the
codefendant).' 55 The confession was unreliable because the codefendant was
obviously motivated to blame the defendant. This "unreliability" was
"intolerably compounded" when the codefendant was not subject to crossexamination, thus resulting in an unfair trial.5 6 The antithesis of this
proposition was that if the evidence was not unreliable, or if it was "inherently
reliable," confrontation could be dispensed with without affecting the fairness
of the trial. This antithesis, only implicit at the time of Bruton, would be
explicitly stated when the Court returned to hearsay cases in the ensuing years.
The critical nature of the unconfronted evidence and the functional purpose
of confrontation would serve as the basis for Justice Stewart's succinct, yet
historically significant, concurring opinion in Bruton. In his view,
A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause . . . is that
certain kinds of hearsay are at once so damaging, so suspect,
and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted
to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically
deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give. It
is for this very reason that an out-of-court accusation is
universally conceded to be constitutionally inadmissible
against the accused, rather than admissible for the little it may
be worth.' 57

152. Id. at 128 n.3.
153. Id. at 136.
154. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
155. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 137 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). As examples of these "certain
kinds of hearsay," Justice Stewart cited Pointer and Douglas. This is significant because it
demonstrates that, in his view, hearsay other than codefendant's statements would fall under the
Confrontation Clause's absolute inadmissibility rule. The extrajudicial statement in Pointerwas
the statement of the victim-eyewitness.
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The early cases that applied Bruton added much to the Bruton doctrine but
little to the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence."' An exception is
Nelson v. O'Neil.'" However, Nelson followed a third era in the Court's
Confrontation Clause chronology, beginning with the 1970 decision in
Californiav. Green,6 ' in which the Court all but denounced assertions made
in the earlier hearsay cases.
d. Hearsay Cases (1970 - 1972), PartII
After the Court gave notification that the Confrontation Clause had its
parameters in Pointer, it was soon given the opportunity to define those
parameters. In California v. Green"' a prosecution witness had testified at a
preliminary hearing identifying defendant Green as a drug supplier. By trial
time, the witness's memory had "lapsed" and the prosecution offered instead
62
the sworn preliminary hearing testimony.1 Relying on Pointer,Mattox, and
dicta in Barber,the Court upheld the introduction of the former testimony. The
Court reasoned that the preliminary hearing testimony had been given "under
163
circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical trial.
Ignoring its previous recognition-that a preliminary hearing is "ordinarily a
much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a
trial ... because its function is the more limited one of determining whether

158. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968) (per curiam) (quoting Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293,298 (1967)), held that Bruton was to be applied retroactively because it was a rule
of criminal procedure "fashioned to correct serious flaws in the fact-finding process at trial."
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251-54 (1969), subjected the Bruton doctrine, in
appropriate cases, to a harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Schneble v. Florida,405 U.S. 427 (1972), and Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973),
involved applications of the harmless error doctrine. The propriety of a harmless error analysis
to Bruton cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
159. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
160. 399 U.S. 149(1970). A discussion of Nelson will follow the discussion of the Court's
hearsay cases, Part II. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
161. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
162. Id. at 152. The witness's prior testimony was admitted pursuant to a California statute
that allowed the introduction of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. Id.
Admission was under a minority view that admitted all prior inconsistent statements, not under
a former testimony exception as in Pointerand Barber.This minority view is recognized in some
states, after the passage of rules of evidence, see MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(l); UTAH R. EVID.
801(d)(1), but is not recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)
(providing that prior inconsistent statements under oath are admissible as nonhearsay when the
declarant is present and testifying). Interestingly, the Court based its rationale in Green on the
former testimony exception, reasoning that because the witness's testimony would have been
admitted under the former testimony rule had the witness been unavailable at trial, the same
result should occur when the witness was not unavailable, but simply forgetful. See id. at 159.
163. Green, 399 U.S. at 165. Those circumstances, according to the Court, were that the
witness was under oath, before a judicial tribunal equipped to produce a record, the defendant
was represented by counsel, and counsel had "every opportunity to cross-examine." Id.
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probable cause exists . . ."164-- the Court concluded that "substantial
compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement" ' had
been accomplished.
In allowing "substantial compliance with the purposes" of confrontation
to satisfy confrontation, the Court focused on three functions of confrontation.
First, a witness must testify under oath to impress upon the witness the
solemnity of the matter. Second, a witness must be subject to crossexamination, the function of which was to find the truth. Third, the witness
must be observed by the factfinder in order to aid the factfinder in assessing the
66
witness's credibility.1
Had the Court adhered to its often-stated principle that the Confrontation
Clause protects trial rights, the result in Green might have been different. But
instead of focusing on whether the defendant had the right to confront at trial,
the Court focused only on one facet of confrontation-availability at trial for
cross-examination. Because the witness was present at trial and subject to
cross-examination about his prior testimony, the Court concluded that the "outof-court statement for all practical purposes regains most of the lost
protections."' 6 7
The decision in Green was problematic for many reasons. One problem,
recognized years earlier in Barber, was the dramatic differences between a
preliminary hearing and a trial. While most states allow the defense the
opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing, the limited purpose of
the hearing dictates that defense counsel cross-examine in an altogether
different manner and for an altogether different purpose than at trial. 6 '
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in Green, was displeased with
the Court's return to and resolution of the issue:
I thought that our decision in Barber v. Page resolved this
issue. In Barberwe stated that confrontation at a preliminary
hearing cannot compensate for the absence of confrontation
at trial, because the nature and objectives of the two
proceedings differ significantly .... [W]e stated . . . "[t]he
right to confrontation is basically a trial right. A preliminary
hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into
the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is

164. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 726 (1968).
165. Green, 399 U.S. at 166.
166. Id. at 158.
167. Id.
168. Counsel will rarely find it helpful to reveal trial strategy or defenses in the preliminary
hearing. Until the State's evidence is heard at the preliminary hearing, defense strategy may be
uncertain; defenses may be evolving. Furthermore, if the defense is well-established by the time
of the preliminary hearing, little can be gained by previewing the defense for the court, because
dismissal at a preliminary hearing does not affect the state's right to seek an indictment against
the defendant and to pursue the charges further.
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the more limited one of determining whether probable cause
exists to hold the accused for trial.'

69

A second problem with the Green decision was the Court's suggestion that
presenting the witness at trial removed any confrontation issues that the
admission of out-of-court, unconfronted testimony presented. 70 This
suggestion, while theoretically palatable, is impractical.
When the prosecution seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement, it is
presumably doing so because the statement is necessary to prove some part of
the case. What is relevant to the jury, whose duty it is to assess the reliability
of the statement and the credibility of the witnesses, are the circumstances
surrounding the statement and the giving of the statement. Do the
circumstances suggest, for example, that the witness was distracted during the
event, or was the witness completely focused on the event? What had the
witness done immediately before the event, and what did the witness do
thereafter? How quickly and certainly did the witness respond when questioned
about the event? What were the witness's demeanor, facial expressions, and
attitude? These and countless other inquiries, often brought out through crossexamination, give the jury a view of the total situation enabling the jury to
determine the reliability of the statement. Thus, when a witness takes the stand
and testifies to a fact or series of facts, the jury is able to evaluate credibility
and reliability because it observes the witness and hears both the statement and
the circumstances surrounding the statement.
On the other hand, when the jury is presented only with the statement via
a written transcript, it receives only a portion of what it needs to perform its
function in the case. The jury neither hears nor observes the witness while the
witness is describing the event. Instead, it hears questions and answers read
without the benefit of pauses, inflections, or intonations. To suggest that the
defense is able to provide the jury with the remaining tools it needs to assess
the evidence by allowing the defendant to cross-examine the witness is
unrealistic. In addition, to place that responsibility on the defense shifts the
burden of proof, usurps the presumption of innocence, and makes the right of
confrontation an option which the defense may waive or precariously risk
exercising.' 7 '

169. 399 U.S. at 195 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan also
reminded the Court that they had retroactively applied the Barber principle a year earlier in
another California case, Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969), in which the defense had

conducted a cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. See Green, 399 U.S. at 196.
170. See Green, 399 U.S. at 198-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Ordinarily, the cross-examination at a preliminary hearing will be limited. The direct
examination is also more limited than it would be at trial, because the state has only to establish
probable cause. When the State is allowed to introduce the preliminary hearing transcript at trial,

the defense must decide whether to rest on the meager transcript, which may be an uncompelling
version of the facts, but a version with no cross-examination, or to cross-examine the witness
whose memory may become selectively improved during cross-examination.
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Duttonv. Evans, 72
' which was originally argued before Green,173 presented
a question similar to that raised in Green. Like Green, Dutton involved a state
rule of evidence that differed from the federal and many state rules. Unlike
Green, the evidence rule at issue in Dutton would be one the Court would
revisit frequently over the next two decades. Dutton would also provide the
catalyst for the Court's shift to a functional view of confrontation based
primarily on the reliability of the hearsay statement.
Dutton involved a Georgia evidence statute providing that once a
conspiracy is proved, "the declarations by any one of the conspirators during
the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all."'7
However, Georgia common law differed by providing that all statements would
be admissible so long as the conspirators continued to conceal their identity. 75
Dutton was accused of murdering three Georgia police officers. The chief
witness against Dutton in his trial was an alleged accomplice who had been
granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. In addition, a witness testified
to comments that a codefendant made after returning from court. The evidence
was admissible under Georgia law as a co-conspirator's exception to the
hearsay rule.'76
The plurality readily conceded that whether the Confrontation Clause was
violated was not as easily resolved as whether a hearsay rule was violated.
While the two "are generally designed to protect similar values,' 77 they are not
congruent. Evidence that was admissible under a hearsay rule might or might
not, in the Court's view, be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 178
The plurality opinion in Dutton used terms not previously utilized in
Confrontation Clause cases. The Court began by concluding that the evidence
in the case was not "crucial" or "devastating" as was the evidence in previous
Confrontation Clause cases. 179 Additionally, the evidence did not involve the
use or misuse of a coerced confession, prosecutorial misconduct, or
negligence. 8 ' No joint trial or paper evidence was at issue, nor was the denial
of cross-examination.1'

172. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
173. Dutton was first argued on October 15, 1969; Green was argued on April 20, 1970
and decided on June 23 that same year; Dutton was reargued on October 15, 1970 and finally
decided on December 15, 1970.
174. 400 U.S. at 78 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954)).
175. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 78 (citing Evans v. State, 150 S.E.2d 240, 248 (Ga. 1966)).
176. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 78.
177. 400 U.S. at 81 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
178. See id. at 82.
179. Id. at 87.
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. Id. This facile attempt to distinguish prior cases, or to refuse a disciplined analysis of
this case, is arguably incredulous.
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The plurality.. 2 opinion took great pains to reassert that evidence rules and
the Confrontation Clause were not identical. However, this time the assertion
was for the purpose of establishing that the limitations placed on the
introduction of co-conspirator's statements by federal evidence rules were not
constitutionally mandated, but were rather a product of federal conspiracy law.
Thus, Georgia's choice to provide expanded admissibility of co-conspirator's
statements was not an issue of constitutional law." 3
The Court concluded that its prior hearsay cases did not support the
defendant's Confrontation Clause claim." 4 Likewise, the Bruton cases were
distinguishable. Here, the Court stated both the obvious-that this case did not
involve a joint trial of codefendants-and the not-so-obvious-that no
recognized hearsay exception was applicable in Bruton.' 5 This recognition was
profound. In effect, the Court was suggesting that statements admissible under
recognized hearsay exceptions might not raise confrontation issues at all. As
if it realized the significance of the implication, the Court immediately added:
It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem
from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the
two, and we decline to do so now. We confine ourselves,
instead, to deciding the case before us.
This case does not involve evidence in any sense
'crucial" or "devastating," as did all the cases just discussed.
It does not involve the use, or misuse, of a confession made
It
in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation ....
does not involve any suggestion of prosecutorial misconduct
It does not involve the use by the
or even negligence ....
It does not involve a
prosecution of a paper transcript ....
joint trial . . . . And it certainly does not involve the
wholesale denial of cross-examination ....
What followed was, in effect, a harmless error analysis (and Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence would have benefited had the Court chosen that
approach) in Confrontation Clause clothing. But two points made, but
unnecessary to the decision, would cause problems in future cases. The first
was the Court's indefensible assertion that "[f]rom the viewpoint of the
Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and
whose demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant not

182. Justice Harlan concurred with the result in Dutton, casting doubt on some of his
earlier viewpoints expressed in Green. See 400 U.S. at 93-100 (Harlan, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 87-88.
184. 400 U.S. at 83-85.
185. Id. at 86-87.
186. Id. at 86-87 (citations omitted).
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only as to what he has seen but also as to what he has heard." '87 In other words,
if the government calls any witness to the stand who is subject to crossexamination, the Constitution allows that witness to testify as to other
witnesses' statements, though those other witnesses are not subject to crossexamination or confrontation. Obviously, this assertion creates a hollow
confrontation right controlled, and easily abused, by the government.
The second problem was Dutton's contribution to the functional view of
the Confrontation Clause. After explaining that confrontation of the actual
declarant would have been of little consequence to the defendant,' the Court
observed that the declarant's statements were "spontaneous, and... against his

penal interest .... These are indicia of reliability which have been widely

viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury.
though there is no confrontation of the declarant."' 89 Notably absent in the
opinion are citations to any cases or commentary expressing these wide views.
Two years after the Court's 1970 decisions in Green and Dutton, the Court
analyzed a confrontation claim in another hearsay case, Mancusi v. Stubbs. 90
The victim-eyewitness in Stubbs had testified and was cross-examined at a trial
resulting in Stubbs's conviction.' 9' Following a reversal, and the witness's
relocation to Sweden, the witness's previous testimony was admitted, over
objection, at defendant's second trial.' 92 The Court upheld the admission of the
evidence based on a test gleaned from Barber, Green, and Dutton. As to the
Barber portion of the test, the Court concluded that the "predicate of
93 However,
unavailability was sufficiently stronger here than in Barber.... ,"'
satisfying the predicate was not enough; the Court must also consider the
"adequacy of [the] examination at the first trial .. .

187. Id.at 88.
188. The Court reasoned (1) that since the statement was not an express assertion of past
fact, it carried an implicit warning that it should be given little weight; (2) that other evidence
established the likelihood that the declarant was knowledgeable about the subject matter of the
statement, thus making it implausible that cross-examination as to knowledge would be fruitful;
(3) that it was unlikely that the declarant had a faulty memory; and (4) that the circumstances
indicated reliability. See id. at 88-89. The Court added this conclusion: "[T]he possibility that
cross-examination of [the declarant] could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement,
though made, might have been unreliable was wholly unreal." Id. at 89. The Court ignores
several obvious cross-examination points illustrated by both Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion and Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 90 (Blackmun,
J., concurring); id. at 100-01 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
189. Id. at 89.
190. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
191. Id. at 208. Some disagreement in the Court's decision centered around the fact that
Stubbs' case arose on habeas and alleged, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel
based on the fact that counsel was appointed only four days before trial of his murder case. See
id. at 209.
192. Id.at 209.

193. Id. at 212. The Court's reference to unavailability as a "predicate" is significant.
194. Id. at 213.
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The second inquiry focused on Dutton's "indicia of reliability" requirement
and whether the trier of fact had a "satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement" under Green.' The Court summarily dispensed with this
analysis, crediting the statements per se because of their nature as prior
recorded testimony. The Court easily concluded that the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights were not violated because the witness had testified
and was subject to cross-examination at the first trial. Absent was any
discussion of the part of the test attributed to Green-whetherthe factfinder
96
had a sufficient basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.1
After Stubbs, the Court would not consider another hearsay case until
1980, when it would apply the reliability-based functional approach used in
Green. As is often the case, Green's import was not totally understood until
that application ten years later in Ohio v. Roberts.'97
Bruton Cases Revisited... and Revised (1971 - 1979)

e.

After dealing with the normal byproducts of establishing a new criminal
procedure rule, the Court in the 1970s limited the application of the Bruton
principle in several cases, as illustrated by its 1971 decision in Nelson v.
O'Neil.'9' These cases were largely decided based on the functional view of
confrontation expressed in Bruton.
Unlike Bruton, the codefendant in Nelson whose statement was introduced
in the joint trial testified, denied making the statement, and was available for
cross-examination, though defense counsel did not cross-examine. As a matter
of evidence law, the codefendant's statement was not admissible against the
defendant. Therefore, the trial judge instructed the jury that the statement could
only be considered against the codefendant, not the defendant.' 99
The Supreme Court in Nelson declared the limits of Bruton in terms
revealed in Green. Bruton applied only when the codefendant whose statement
was introduced was "unavailable at the trial for 'full and effective' cross-

195. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 213 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)) ("It
is clear ...that even though the witness be unavailable his prior testimony must bear some of
these 'indicia of reliability' referred to in Dutton.").
196. A review of the portion of the Green decision, to which Stubbs attributed this part of
the test, suggests that the Court was merely giving lip service to the idea that more than crossexamination was required to satisfy confrontation. See Green, 399 U.S. at 161. The Court in

Green implied that the trier of fact was given an adequate opportunity tojudge the reliability of
the evidence when the evidence was former testimony. Of course, a trier of fact presented with
prior testimony has only one arrow in its quiver with which to assess credibility-the testimony.
Absent are the witness's demeanor, composure, hesitancy or lack of hesitancy, voice inflection,
facial expressions, and a whole host of other factors that cannot be evaluated based on a

transcript of the previous testimony.
197. 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see infra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
198. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).

199. Id. at 624.
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examination."200 The fact that the codefendant disaffirmed the extrajudicial
statement did not deprive the defendant of the right to full and effective crossexamination. The Court acknowledged that Bruton and Douglas explicitly
stated that a witness could not be effectively confronted unless the witness
affirmed the prior statement, but concluded that these statements were dicta
because the witnesses in those cases did not testify.2"'
Utilizing the functional view of confrontation introduced in Bruton and
reiterated in Green, the Court explained why no violation occurred. Had the
codefendant affirmed the statement, the defendant's cross-examination task
would have been difficult. The defendant would have to show that the
codefendant's confession was false and, thus, that the codefendant was lying
or that the confession was at least partially false in its references to the
defendant. In the latter situation, the defendant would then have to explain why
he and the codefendant were found together in a stolen car. Had the witness
affirmed the statement, but claimed it to be unreliable because it was coerced,
cross-examination would not be beneficial because the defendant would then
want the jury to believe, as the codefendant was now testifying, that the
confession was untrue as to both of them.20 2 Given this, the actual testimony at
trial was "more favorable to the respondent than any that cross-examination by
counsel could possibly have produced ....

It would be unrealistic in the

extreme ... to hold that the respondent was denied either the opportunity or the
benefit of full and effective cross-examination ... ""'
The Court used the functional view of confrontation again eight years after
Nelson. In Parkerv. Randolph,2" a plurality declined to apply Bruton to a case
in which the defendant's own confession corroborated that of the codefendant.
Focusing on function, the plurality observed that the "right protected by
Bruton-the 'constitutional right of cross-examination'- has far less practical
value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has
20 5
consistently maintained his innocence.
f

Hearsay Cases (1980-1992), PartII1

In the 1980s, the Court expanded the test applied in 1972 in Stubbs and
quickly retreated from any suggestion that confrontation was a bundle of rights
essential to a fair trial. The new restricted view of the confrontation right in
hearsay cases continued until 1994 and spread into the cross-examination cases
in which the Court also retreated from its earlier holdings that suggested an
absolute right to cross-examine.

200. Id. at 626-27.

201. Id. at 627-28.
202. Id. at 628-29.
203. Id. at 629.
204. 442 U.S. 62 (1979).

205. Id. at 73 (citations omitted).
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The Court had not considered a hearsay case for almost a decade since its
decisions in Stubbs and, more importantly, Green. Now the Court returned to
the reliability-based functional approach used in Green. As is often the case,
Green's import became apparent only after it was applied to different facts ten
years later in Ohio v. Roberts.2 °6 While much of the language in Green
suggested that confrontation was satisfied by virtue of the witness's presence
at trial, which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine in the jury's
presence, the Roberts Court clarified that even without the subsequent
opportunity to cross-examine, the witness's prior testimony would have been
admissible. °7
Unlike the fact situation in Green, the witness who testified at the
preliminary hearing and incriminated the defendant in Roberts did not appear
at trial.2 °8 Thus, the Court's Green rationale, that somehow the presence at trial
caused the out-of-court statement to regain "most of the lost protections, 2 9
could not be used to affirm the lower court's allowance of the prior testimony.
Had the Supreme Court strictly adhered to the reasoning set forth in Green,
the Court would have been required to reverse the Ohio court's ruling that
allowed the preliminary hearing testimony to be introduced at trial. Unlike the
witness in Green, the witness in Roberts was not available for crossexamination. Yet, the Court noted that counsel had asked "[n]o less than 17
plainly leading questions,"21 challenging the witness's story at the preliminary
hearing and thereby affording "'substantial compliance with the purposes
behind the confrontation requirement." 211 Thus, the presence of the witness at
trial for cross-examination was not required. Rather, the opportunity to crossexamine anytime, even if that opportunity was not fully exercised, satisfied the
constitutional right to confrontation. 2
What is perhaps most disingenuous about the stretching of Green to fit the
facts in Roberts is that the issue before the Court in Roberts was not at issue in
Green and thus not briefed, argued, or analyzed. Nonetheless, when the issue
reached the Court in Roberts, the Court did not analyze the application of the
principle espoused in Green, but rather applied the principle to the
distinguishable facts as if it were established law. The Court's reasoning was
this: Green recognized that it was senseless to allow the introduction at trial
of an unavailable witness's former testimony while disallowing the
introduction at trial of the former testimony of a witness who appeared, but had
a faulty memory.21 3 The Roberts Court accepted this proposition as established
law, although, in reality, former testimony had been allowed only in cases of
206. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

207. See id. at 69-70 n. 10.
208. Id. at 59.
209. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).

210. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70 n.11.
211. Id. at 71 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 166).
212. Id. at 73 &n.12.
213. See Green, 399 U.S. at 161.
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absolute necessity, as when the witness had died, and when a previous crossexamination had occurred. Now that the Court was faced with the situation, the
majority relied on the ipse dixit language from Green and did not analyze
whether the admission of former
testimony comported with the constitutional
214
confrontation requirement.
The facts in Roberts make the Court's decision even more troubling. In
Roberts, the State was not relying upon former testimony to prove an element
of the case. The witness's former testimony was offered in rebuttal after the
defendant had testified to his innocence. Furthermore, the witness whose
former testimony the State offered had been called to testify by the defendant
during the preliminary hearing." 5 The Court did not mention these facts,
although arguably both provide a basis for distinguishing the case from the
other hearsay cases the Court had decided.
Although the majority stretched the Green decision to cover the Roberts
facts, it did not do so with total comfort. A comfortable fit would have allowed
the majority to apply Green without supplementation. Instead, the Roberts
Court supplemented the Green opinion regarding the admissibility of prior
testimony with a new prerequisite: the need for the testimony.
Four points should be noted from Roberts. The first is the recognition that
an absence of confrontation may affect the very integrity of the fact-finding
mission. Second, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity as a
prerequisite to the admission of out-of-court statements. Third, only reliable
hearsay is admissible, even after constitutional necessity is established. Finally,
all hearsay that is not inherently reliable is presumptively inadmissible, unless
the state establishes adequate particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.2" 6

214. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73.
215. Id. at 58-59. At the preliminary hearing, the State introduced the testimony of a

property owner, Mr. Isaacs, and several other witnesses. After the State rested its case, the
defense counsel called Anita Isaacs, Mr. Isaacs' daughter, as a witness and unsuccessfully tried
to establish that she had authorized the defendant to use credit cards and checks belonging to Mr.

Isaac. When defendant took the witness stand at trial and claimed that Anita had authorized his
use of the cards, the State was allowed to introduce Anita's prior preliminary hearing testimony
in rebuttal. Id. The Court could have viewed the evidence as nonhearsay impeachment evidence
not raising confrontation concerns, as it would later do in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409
(1985). In Street, a codefendant's statement to the police was allowed into evidence for the
"legitimate, nonhearsay purpose of rebutting [defendant's] testimony .... " 471 U.S. at 417.
"The nonhearsay aspect of [the codefendant's statement] ... raises no Confrontation Clause
concerns." Id. at 414. Alternatively, the Court could have upheld the admission based on the
unfairness that would occur if the defense were allowed to open the door on the issue and then
protest when the State sought to rebut the evidence. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150,
167 (1995).
216. The majority used this language:

[C]ertain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that
admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the
"substance of the constitutional protection." .
...Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the

20031
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One of the four Roberts' principles was soon discarded. In a federal drug
2 17
the Court revisited the constitutional
conspiracy case, United States v. Inadi,

necessity requirement set forth in Roberts. The government offered, as
substantive evidence, tape recordings of conversations between unindicted coconspirators.2 1 1 Over objection, the trial court admitted the out-of-court
statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.219 On
appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the principles set forth
in Roberts, reversed the conviction because the government had not established
the unavailability of the declarants.22 °
The Supreme Court reversed, undoing the constitutional necessity prong
Roberts:
of
There are good reasons why the unavailability rule,
developed in cases involving forner testimony, is not
applicable to co-conspirators' out-of-court statements. Unlike
some other exceptions to the hearsay rules, or the exemption
from the hearsay definition involved in this case, former
testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony.
It seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its own,
but is intended to replace live testimony ....

When two

available, longstanding
versions of the same evidence are
principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to
Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evidence. But
if the declarant is unavailable, no "better" version of the
evidence exists, and the former testimony may be admitted as
a substitute for live testimony on the same point.
Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator
statements. Because they are made while the conspiracy is in
progress, such statements provide evidence of the
conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the
" '
declarant testifies to the same matters in court.22
Utilizing a benefit-burden analysis, the majority held that requiring an
unavailability analysis every time the government wanted to introduce a co-

evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). An inference of reliability is
notably not the same as a presumption of reliability.
217. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
218. Inadi, 475 U.S at 390.

219. The rule provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is
"a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(2)(E).
220. United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1984).
221. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
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conspirator's out-of-court statement would substantially burden an already
burdened criminal justice system.222 Thus, the Court concluded that the
Constitution did not require a showing of unavailability prior to the admission
of a co-conspirator's statements against an accused criminal.223
Startled at this new focus on prosecutorial convenience, the dissent
asserted what most courts had assumed following Roberts-that the
unavailability requirement was a rule of constitutional necessity, a condition
precedent to infringement upon the constitutional guarantee of confrontation.224
The dissent argued that the compromise of a constitutional right justified
requiring proof of necessity and should not be displaced with a benefit-burden
analysis.225 The dissent also questioned the majority's assertion that Roberts
had cited only former testimony cases.226 Instead, Roberts had relied upon

222. Id. at 399. Among the burdens perceived by the majority were added appellate review;
the difficulty that would be placed on the prosecution in ascertaining the identify and location
of declarants; and making declarants available at trial, particularly if the declarants were not
incarcerated. Id. at 398-99.
223. Id. at 399-400. Because the unavailability issue was the sole issue addressed by the
Third Circuit, it was likewise the only issue reached by the Court. Id. at 391 n.3. Nevertheless,
the Court gave a thumbs-up to the reliability of co-conspirator's statements, adding in closing
that in accord with the plurality decision in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), "we continue
to affirm the validity of the use of co-conspirator statements .... Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400. This
led the dissent to characterize it as a "small step" for the specific case, but a "giant leap" with
regard to constitutional ramifications. Id. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority
would further its affirmation of the reliability of co-conspirators' statements in Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987), the next term.
224. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 402-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition to the Third Circuit,
most of the other courts faced with the issue pre-Inadi had applied Roberts literally and
recognized a "Sixth Amendment... rule of necessity." See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65
(1979). The Sixth Circuit had so ruled in Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984). Likewise, the Eighth Circuit had so held in United
States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984). A year after its Inadi decision, the Third
Circuit had followed its reasoning in Inadi.See United States v. Caputo, 758 F.2d 944, 951 (3d
Cir. 1985); see also Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying
Roberts), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984); United States v. Washington, 688 F.2d 953, 959
(5th Cir. 1982) (same).
225. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 408 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
226. See id. at 402-03.
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Douglas v. Alabama227 and Dutton v. Evans,228 involving an accomplice's
confession and a conspirator's statement, respectively.
Although the Court did not require unavailability as a constitutional
prerequisite in Inadi, the Court declined to clarify whether Inadi or Roberts
applied to hearsay cases not involving either former testimony or coconspirators' statements. Rather, in Idaho v. Wright,229 the case that followed

Inadi chronologically, the Court noted that the issue of unavailability was not
raised and assumed "without deciding that, to the extent the unavailability
requirement applies in this case, the [witness] was an unavailable witness
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. '23 ' After Wright, arguably,
unavailability was still a constitutional prerequisite for some types of hearsay,
especially since the hearsay in Wright had been admitted under a hearsay
exception that did not require the unavailability of the declarant.
The statements introduced in Wright were those of a two-and-one-half
year-old child, testified to by an examining pediatrician. The state court
admitted the statements under the Idaho residual hearsay exception that allowed
the introduction of hearsay statements not covered by other hearsay exceptions
that had "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."23'

227. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Douglas,decided the same day as Pointer,was the Court's first
application of the Confrontation Clause in a state case not involving former testimony. The case
is curious, at best. A prosecutor repeatedly questioned a witness who had asserted his privilege
to remain silent as to whether he had made certain statements to the police that incriminated both
the witness and the defendant who was on trial. The witness refused to acknowledge the
statements or to testify at all except as to his name. The trial judge also allowed the prosecutor
to call law enforcement officers who testified that the document from which he had read was a
"confession" made by the witness. See Douglas,380 U.S. at 416-17. The Supreme Court noted
that the questioning and refusals to answer were not "technically testimony," but asserted that
the statement "constituted the only direct evidence" that the defendant had committed the
offense. Id. at 418; see supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. A better disposition would
have been a dismissal, based on insufficient evidence (or more correctly, no evidence, since the
asking of questions to which there is no response does not constitute testimony). Nonetheless,
the Court continues to cite Douglas for the proposition that the inability of the defendant to
cross-examine the witness was a denial of "the right of cross-examination secured by the
Confrontation Clause." Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (quoting Douglas, 380 U.S.
at 419).
228. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Dutton involved the introduction of co-conspirator statements
under a Georgia statute that allowed the admission of co-conspirator statements made after the
termination of the conspiracy, but while the conspiracy was still being concealed. While the
Dutton Court allowed the evidence, it did so by concluding that confrontation at trial would be
of little consequence. While it is true that the witness which the prosecutor failed to produce was
likely available, the Dutton Court did not address the unavailability issue. See supra notes 17289 and accompanying text.
229. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
230. Id. at 816. Rather than assert that Inadi had resolved the issue of constitutional
necessity, the Court stated that Inadi had held that the "general requirement of unavailability did
not apply to incriminating out-of-court statements made by a non-testifying co-conspirator...."
Id. at 815. This statement justifies a conclusion that the Court was still contemplating the
applicability of unavailability to other contexts.
231. Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24) is identical in content to former Federal Rule of
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In Wright, the Court, for the first time, candidly stated the interrelationship
between hearsay and confrontation: "The Confrontation Clause... bars the
admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule." '32 Now the task was to explain when the bar
applied. The evidence in Wright was presumptively inadmissible under hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause and would be admitted only if it bore
sufficient indicia of reliability, which can be inferred without more where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.233 In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness., 23 4 After analyzing the exception 235 and then the
statements,236 the Court concluded that the introduction of these hearsay
statements under the state's residual hearsay exception violated confrontation.
A mere two years later, the Court dealt decisively with the issue left at bay
in Wright. In White v. Illinois237 a child-victim's statements were admitted at
trial through adults, namely a babysitter, a parent, a police officer, a nurse, and
a physician. Relying upon two hearsay exceptions-spontaneous declaration 8
and statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment 239-- the trial court
admitted the statements over the defendant's objection, based upon the federal
Confrontation Clause.24 °
The Court removed any uncertainty as to whether the Constitution required
the State to establish necessity, or unavailability, in order to introduce hearsay
as a substitute for in-court testimony. "Roberts stands for the proposition that
unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry

Evidence 803(24). The former rule and its unavailability counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(5), have been combined and transferred to Federal Rule of Evidence 807.
232. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814.
233. Id. at 816.
234. Id. at 816 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
235. "Hearsay statements admitted under the residual exception, almost by definition,
therefore do not share the same tradition of reliability that supports the admissibility of
statements under a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. at 817.
236. "Because evidence possessing 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' must be
at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, we think that
evidence admitted under the former requirement must similarly be so trustworthy that adversarial
testing would add little to its reliability." Id. at 821. "Viewing the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the younger daughter's responses to Dr. Jambura's questions, we find no special
reason for supposing that the incriminating statements were particularly trustworthy." Id. at 826.
Much of the Court's decision focused on what circumstances could be considered in assessing
particular trustworthiness. The Court concluded that the "relevant circumstances include only
those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy
of belief." Id. at 819.
237. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). Justice Brennan had left the Court after the Wright but before
the White decision.
238. This exception is the equivalent ofwhat most rules of evidence, including the Federal
Rules of Evidence, refer to as an excited utterance. See FED. R. EvIo. 803(2).
239. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
240. See White, 502 U.S. at 349-51.
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only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of
a prior judicial proceeding.""24
Thus, only when the prior statements have been the "substantial
equivalent" of in-court testimony and have been given under oath (impressing
upon the witness the solemnity of the occasion and subjecting the witness to
perjury charges in the event of lying), in the presence of the defendant, and
subjected to cross-examination (or the opportunity to cross-examine) does the
Constitution require the State to demonstrate a need for the testimony. When
the statement is unconfronted (not given under oath, before a jury, or subject
to cross-examination), the State does not have to "need" the testimony in order
to introduce it. The State can choose in those situations whether to use the prior
statement or present the witness. If the prior statement is admissible under the
rules of evidence, no confrontation issue exists. 42
g.

Cross-ExaminationCases (1984, 1986-1987)

Following its assertion of a test in the hearsay cases in the 1980s, the
Supreme Court considered four cross-examination cases. In the most
straightforward case of the four decided, the Court held that a total denial of the
right to cross-examine a witness about potential bias violated the Confrontation
Clause. In Delawarev. Van Arsdall,243 the Court reversed a trial court ruling
that precluded the defense from questioning a key witness about matters
relevant to bias or motivation. In holding that the denial of cross-examination
violated the right to confrontation, the Court linked the right to one of its
elements, cross-examination. 2" In the other three decisions, the Court would
make it clear that even if cross-examination was the heart of confrontation,
even the heart was not indispensable.
In the first of these cases, Delaware v. Fensterer, the Court summarily
disposed of a case in which the defendant alleged a confrontation violation as
a result of the denial of "effective" cross-examination. In Fensterer the
prosecution's expert witness testified to a conclusion, based upon a scientific
2
examination, but could not recollect the foundation for his expert opinion. "
The defense expert had spoken to the expert before trial, learned the foundation
of the expert's opinion, and was of the opinion that the foundation lacked
scientific support. Since the expert could not recall the foundation, he did not
testify to it. As a result, fertile, effective defense cross-examination of the
expert was foiled. The Court found no restriction on the right to cross-examine

241. Id. at 354 (citation omitted).
242. See id. at 354-55.

243. 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (precluding cross-examination at trial about the state's dismissal
of a criminal charge against a key witness).
244. Id. at 684.
245. 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam).
246. Id. at 16.
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because "the trial court did not limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's
247
cross-examination in any way.
While this statement about the Fensterercase was undoubtedly accurate,
the Court, in defending its affirmation, went far beyond what was necessary.
This is illustrated by the Court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska,248 a crossexamination case decided two years earlier. In Davis the Court invalidated a
state statute that denied an accused the right to cross-examine a crucial witness
about a juvenile conviction. The statute violated the Confrontation Clause
because "[c]onfrontation means more than being allowed to confront the
witness physically., 249 The Clause was violated in some situations because
"restrictions on the scope of cross-examination . . . 'effectively . . .
emasculate[d] the right of cross-examination itself.""'50
The FenstererCourt supplemented the Davis holding with some unrelated
language from Roberts and held that the Confrontation Clause "guarantees an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish., 25 ,
This is an excellent example of the Court's careless amalgamation of reasoning
from one kind of a case to a different kind of case with no analysis as to
whether the reasoning applied. The opportunity to cross-examine in Roberts
was an actual opportunity to cross-examine the witness at a previous
proceeding in the same case. Now the Court extracted that language and
asserted it in a much different setting, arguably one in which it was not
appropriate.
The Court used the opportunity theory in two cross-examination cases
decided in 1987, two years after Fensterer. In the first, Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie,2 a plurality of the Court reemphasized that confrontation was a "trial
right," but added that it was "designed to prevent improper restrictions on the
types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination." '53
Thus, the Ritchie Court reasoned, Davis had not held that the Alaska statute
making certain juvenile records confidential violated the Confrontation Clause;
rather the Constitution was violated in that case because cross-examination
about those juvenile records was precluded.254 By making this oblique
distinction, the plurality in Ritchie concluded that the Constitution was not
violated when a victim's mental health records were withheld from defense

247. Id. at 19.
248. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).

249. Id. at 315.

250. Fensterer,474 U.S. at 19 (citing Davis and quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129,

131 (1968)).
251. Id. at 20 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 n.12 (1980)). This language is
referred to in this Article as the Court's "opportunity theory."
252. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion).

253. Id. at 52 (citations omitted).
254. Id.
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counsel. ' Because counsel was allowed to cross-examine the witness, the
Confrontation Clause was not implicated.256
Justice Blackmun, the fifth vote to affirm in Ritchie, explicitly rejected this
portion of the plurality opinion. He wrote:
[The plurality] believes that [the right of confrontation] is
satisfied so long as defense counsel can question a witness on
any proper subject of cross-examination.... [T]he plurality
in effect dismisses-or, at best, downplays-any inquiry into
the effectiveness of cross-examination. Thus, the plurality
confidently can state that the Confrontation Clause creates
nothing more than a trial right.
If I were to accept the plurality's effort to divorce
confrontation analysis from any examination into the
effectiveness of cross-examination, I believe that in some
situations the confrontation right would become an empty
formality ....

The opportunity the Confrontation Clause

gives a defendant's attorney to pursue any proper avenue of
questioning a witness makes little sense set apart from the
goals of cross-examination ....
I do not believe . . . that a State can avoid
Confrontation Clause problems simply by deciding to hinder
the defendant's right to effective cross-examination... at the
pretrial, rather than at the trial, stage.2 57
Justice Blackmun elaborated on his interpretation of the interplay between
258
confrontation and cross-examination in Kentucky v. Stincer, decided only
four months after Ritchie. The case involved whether the defendant had the
right to be present at a hearing conducted during the trial to determine the
witnesses' competency to testify. 5 9 As such, it would have lent itself to many
analyses. That chosen by the clear majority, and set forth by Justice Blackmun,
26
focused not on the timing of confrontation or cross-examination, but upon its
255. Id. at 54.
256. Id.

257. Id. at 62, 65.
258. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).

259. Id. at 732.
260. See id. at 740. The State urged the Court to adopt a "critical stage" analysis in order
to find the absence of a Confrontation Clause violation. The Court declined, emphatically, on
two occasions: "Instead of attempting to characterize a competency hearing as a trial or pretrial

proceeding, it is more useful to consider whether excluding the defendant from the hearing
interferes with his opportunity for effective cross-examination." Id. "[T]he question whether a
particular proceeding is critical to the outcome of a trial is not the proper inquiry in determining
whether the Confrontation Clause has been violated. The appropriate question is whether there

has been any interference with the defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination." Id.
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function: "The right to cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation
Clause, thus is essentially a 'functional' right designed to promote reliability
in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial." '' Therefore, the exclusion of
a criminal accused from a hearing held to determine a witness's competency
does not violate confrontation rights when the witnesses are subject to crossexamination during the trial.262
h.

Bruton, Again (1986 - 1987)

After almost a decade of silence on Bruton issues, the Court returned to the
issue of Confrontation Clause rights in joint trials involving the introduction of
confessions of a codefendant. In the first case, in a most bizarre set of
circumstances, the Court upheld the basic tenets of Bruton, notwithstanding the
fact that the trial was conducted by a judge rather than a jury. In Lee v.
Illinois,263 despite assurances that the evidence at a joint trial would be
considered "separately for each defendant," the trial judge relied upon portions
of a codefendant's confession as substantive evidence against the defendant.264
The majority asserted, for the first time, a symbolic approach to the
Confrontation Clause.265 Perhaps of more lasting import would be the Court's
use of tests established in recent hearsay cases to analyze the confrontation
claim. The Court concluded that the codefendant's confessions were
presumptively unreliable and that the confession before it did not bear
sufficient independent indicia of reliability.266
The year after Lee, the Court decided, on the same day, two other Bruton
cases, which gave Justice Scalia his first opportunity to enter the Court's

at 744-45 n.17. This assertion equates confrontation and cross-examination. The inquiry for
evaluating whether the "function" of confrontation has been satisfied is whether there has been
an interference with cross-examination.
261. Id. at 737.
262. See id. at 744 ("Because respondent had the opportunity for full and effective crossexamination of the two witnesses during trial, and because of the nature of the competency
hearing at issue in this case, we conclude that respondent's rights under the Confrontation Clause

were not violated by his exclusion from the competency hearing ....
").
263. 476 U.S. 530, 536 (1986)(quoting petitioner's lawyer as saying, "We would ask the
Court to consider the evidence separately for each defendant.").
264. The State conceded reliance on the codefendant's confession to find premeditation,
an essential element of the crime for which Lee was convicted. Id. at 538.
265. See id. at 540.
266. See id. at 443-47. The State argued that the presumed unreliability of the confession
was rebutted by the circumstances surrounding the confession and the fact that the confession
interlocked with the defendant's confession. As to the first contention, the Court noted that the
codefendant had at first declined to be interviewed by the police and had agreed to talk only after
being told that his girlfriend had urged him to share the blame for the crime with her. As to the
second claim, the Court cautioned that "a confession is not necessarily rendered reliable simply
because some of the facts it contains 'interlock' with the facts in the defendant's statement. The
true danger inherent in this type of hearsay is, in fact, its selective reliability." Id. at 545
(citations omitted).
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Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. In Cruz v. New York267 and Richardsonv.
Marsh,268 the Court, through opinions written by Justice Scalia, reiterated the
Bruton principle and attached it to evidence underpinnings.
In Cruz the State introduced, over objection, a codefendant's videotaped
confession implicating the defendant and the codefendant in theirjoint trial.269
The codefendant did not testify. Because the defendant had confessed, the trial
judge applied the rationale of the Parkerplurality, overruled the defendant's
objection, and instructed the jury as to the limited use of the codefendant's
confession.27 On appeal, the majority rejected the Parkerplurality opinion and
its narrow application of Bruton to cases in which the admission of a
codefendant's confession was "devastating" to the defendant's case.271 The
Cruz majority adopted instead Justice Blackmun's position that a defendant's
interlocking confession would not invalidate a confrontation challenge, but
might render the violation harmless.272 Thus, the Court concluded that the
Confrontation Clause was violated by the admission at a joint trial of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant if the
confession was not directly admissible against the defendant. 3 This was true
even if the jury was instructed not to consider the confession against the
defendant.274
Having established the ruling and rationale for the decision, Justice Scalia
did not conclude the opinion, but instead offered the following dicta:
Of course, the defendant's confession may be considered at
trial in assessing whether his codefendant's statements are
supported by sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be directly
admissible against him (assuming the "unavailability" of the
codefendant) despite the lack of opportunity for crossexamination, and may be considered on appeal in assessing
whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless.275

267. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
268. 481 U.S. 200 (1987). In Richardson and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), the
Court would functionalize Bruton, making it inapplicable when the codefendant's confession

could be satisfactorily redacted so as not to refer to the defendant or to the defendant's existence.
The redaction in Richardson was successful in that the confession incriminated the defendant
only inferentially and after the introduction of evidence by the defense. See 481 U.S. at 211.

However, in Gray the inferences that remained after redaction referred to someone directly, most
likely the defendant. Thus, the Bruton principle applied. See 523 U.S. at 192.
269. 481 U.S. at 189.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 191.
272. Id.

273. Id. at 193.
274. Id.

275. 481 U.S. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
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In Lee and Cruz the Court opined that presumptively unreliable and
inadmissible evidence that met certain standards of reliability could
nevertheless be admitted without violating the Confrontation Clause. 76 This
approach, which fused the previously separate approaches used in hearsay and
Bruton cases, would complete the substitution of confrontation rights with
evidence rules.
Another important part of the Cruz opinion was Justice Scalia's definition
of terms within the Clause. The phrase "witness against" as used in the
Confrontation Clause was defined in a seemingly sensible way: "Ordinarily,
a witness is considered to be a witness 'against' a defendant for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause only if his testimony is part of the body of evidence that
'
thejury may consider in assessing his guilt."277
The Court would later abandon
this definition in favor of a much more rigid (and arguably less sensible) one
in the protective devices cases which the Court would next decide.27
i. Protective Devices Cases (1988-1990)
In two cases the Court decided whether a witness testifying at trial, subject
to cross-examination by the defendant and observation by the jury, could,
without violating the Confrontation Clause, be shielded from the defendant's
view. These cases gave the Court, particularly Justice Scalia, yet another
opportunity to revise its confrontation analysis.
In Coy v. Iowa,27 9 the Court considered whether an Iowa statute,280 which

allowed child witnesses to testify without seeing or hearing the defendant,
violated the federal Confrontation Clause. The trial court in Coy had placed a
screen between the thirteen-year-old child witness and the defendant, adjusting
the lighting so the defendant could see the witnesses dimly, but the witnesses
could not see the defendant. 21 The defendant claimed that the Confrontation
Clause gave him the right to face-to-face confrontation and that the Due
276. This is the exact position taken by the dissenting Justices. "Here, the codefendant's

confession carries numerous indicia of reliability; and I gather that the Court's disposition does
not deny the state courts, on remand, the opportunity to deal with the admissibility of that

confession against Cruz." Id. at 198-99 (White, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 190. Justice Scalia would reconcile his two definitions by construing the word

"testimony" as used in his definition to refer only to trial testimony.
278. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (discussing the meaning of the

word "confront").
279. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).

280. The Iowa statute at issue in Coy provided that:
[T]he court may require a party to be confined to an adjacent room or
behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child
during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the

party. However, if a party is so confined, the court shall take measures to
insure that the party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall

inform the child that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.
IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1988).
281. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15.
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Process 28Clause
protected him from procedures that "would make him appear
2
guilty.1
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia asserted unequivocally that the
"Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with
'
The Clause's purpose is "to
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."283
secure the accused the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who
give their testimony' 284
in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of
cross-examination.
Since the very purpose of the screen used by the Iowa trial court was to
allow the witnesses against the accused to avoid seeing the accused, the Court
found it "difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the
defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter. '285 The Court's precedents that
allowed confrontation to be compromised involved rights that were "implicit"
to confrontation, not the "right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the
Clause. 28 6

In response to the State's argument that confrontation rights should yield
to important public interests in protecting the victims of sexual abuse, the Court
suggested that whether exceptions to the "irreducible literal meaning of the
Clause" were allowed depended on whether specific, individualized findings
supported a deviation from the constitutional right.28 7 Exceptions, if allowed at
' not present in the current
all, depended on some "showing of necessity"288
9
case. The "necessity" language hailed from the Roberts decision; more proof
that the Court's refinement of Roberts in Inadi and White was the product of
revision, not restatement.
Perhaps it was this part of the opinion that prompted Justice O'Connor, in
a concurring opinion, to detail what might justify a finding of necessity.29

282. 487 U.S. at 1015.
283. Id. at 1016.

284. Id. at 1017 (quoting Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330(1911) (describing
a provision of the Bill of Rights of the Philippines as "substantially the same as the Sixth
Amendment")).
285. Id. at 1020.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1021.
288. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1992) (describing a rule of necessity
derived, in part, from Coy).
289. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
290. Picking up on this opening left by the majority, Justice O'Connor explained the
"appropriate case" in which the rights secured by the Confrontation Clause might yield to
competing public interests:
[N]othing in today's decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state
legislators to protect child witnesses. Initially, many such procedures may
raise no substantial Confrontation Clause problem since they involve
testimony in the presence of the defendant ....
Moreover, even if a particular state procedure runs afoul of the
Confrontation Clause's general requirements, it may come within an
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Justice O'Connor's opinion did not fall upon deaf ears. Within a year, the Court
decided a case based on a Maryland statute that provided for the use of a
different protective device to shield the child witness during testimony.29 1
Based upon case-specific findings that "testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that
the child cannot reasonably communicate," a trial court could order that the
child testify outside the courtroom.292 Under the statutory provisions, the child,
the prosecutor, and the defense counsel would go into a separate room where
the child would be examined and cross-examined. The examination and crossexamination would be broadcast into the courtroom where the defendant, the
judge, and the jury would view it. The defendant would be allowed to
communicate with defense counsel during the examination.293
In requesting the trial court to invoke the protective procedures in Craig,
the State called an expert who testified to the trauma the children would suffer
if they were required to testify in the courtroom in the defendant's presence.294
This case-specific evidence satisfied the five-member Supreme Court majority
that the State's compelling interest in protecting child witnesses in this case
overrode the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.29
Notably, the procedure utilized in Craigremoved only one of the historic
tenets of cross-examination. The child witness was required to take an oath to
tell the truth; to testify in the presence of the factfinder, who could view the
child's demeanor while testifying; and was subject to cross-examination.29 6 The
Court revived a phrase not recently used and concluded that the Maryland

exception that permits its use ....

Thus, I would permit use of a particular trial procedure that called for
something other than face-to-face confrontation if that procedure was
necessary to further an important public policy.... The protection ofchild
witnesses is, in my view and in the view of a substantial majority of the
States,just such a policy. The primary focus therefore likely will be on the
necessity prong.... [I]f a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity,

as is required by a number of state statutes, our cases suggest that the
strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state
interest of protecting child witnesses.
Id. at 1023-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
291. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). The Maryland statute allowed testimony by
the child to be taken "outside the courtroom and showed in the courtroom by means of a closed
circuit television" after the court made certain enumerated findings. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-102(a)(1) (1989).
292. Craig,497 U.S. at 841 (quoting § 9-102(a)(1)(ii)).
293. Id. at 841-42.
294. Id. at 842.
295. See id. at 855. The holding represents a deference to state's rights. The majority
referenced the state's "traditional and 'transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of
children,"' and the literature documenting trauma caused by in-court testimony, before
concluding that "we will not second-guess the considered judgment of the Maryland Legislature
regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child abuse victims from the emotional
trauma of testifying." Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)).

296. Craig,497 U.S. at 851.
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procedure "adequately ensures that the testimony is both reliable and subject
to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that
accorded live, in-person testimony."297 The only element of confrontation
absent in the Maryland procedure was the requirement that the child's
testimony be given in the physical presence of the defendant.
Prior to the Court's final hearsay case, the prudent approach to
confrontation claims seemed to be to admit evidence that satisfied traditional
hearsay exceptions, but to exclude evidence that fell only under a residual
exception, or perhaps a newly created exception. So long as the State could
pigeon hole its hearsay evidence into a traditional exception, it could dispense
with calling witnesses to testify even to crucial and devastating matters at the
heart of the state's case. But, in 1999, the Court cast doubt on this overly
simplistic approach in Lilly v. Virginia.29"
j.

Hearsay Cases (1999), PartIV

In Lilly the Virginia state court admitted an out-of-court statement that
incriminated the defendant under the state's declaration against penal interest
exception.299 Finding that the declarant was unavailable based on his refusal to
testify, the state trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce taped
statements made by the declarant to law enforcement officers. The statements
incriminated the declarant and the defendant, but attributed the actual murder
in question to the defendant.3"' The defendant argued that the evidence violated
his confrontation rights, but the Virginia courts allowed the evidence, finding
that the declaration against penal interest exception was a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, thus satisfying the indicia of reliability requirement. 30 ,
The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue so easily. A majority found
a violation of the Confrontation Clause and remanded for a determination of
harmfulness, 3 2 but the Court split 4-2-3 on the rationale. The plurality opinion
attempted to announce black letter law in several ways. First, it stated that
whether a hearsay statement fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception for
purposes of satisfying the Confrontation Clause was a federal question.30 3

297. Id. (emphasis added).
298. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
299. Id. at 122. The exception in Virginia was recognized by court decision. See Chandler
v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 224 (Va. 1995).
300. 527 U.S. at 121. Of crucial importance to the Commonwealth of Virginia was proof
that the defendant, Benjamin Lilly, was the actual trigger man since Virginia law only allows
execution of the actual trigger man.
301. Id. at 122.
302. See id. at 139-40.
303. Id. at 125. The plurality used language from Mattox to explain firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions. An exception to the hearsay rule is a firmly rooted exception if it "rests on such a
solid foundation that admission of virtually any evidence within it comports with the 'substance
of the constitutional protection'.... [A] category of hearsay whose conditions have proved over
time 'to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as
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"[Aiccomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within
a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule .... ,,3' Furthermore, accomplice
confessions "given under conditions that implicate the core concerns of the old
ex parte affidavit practice-that is, when the government is involved in the
statements' production, and when the statements describe past events and have
not been subjected to adversarial testing"-would rarely rebut the presumption
305
of unreliability.
Second, the plurality addressed the appropriate standard for appellate
review of the government's claim of trustworthiness. Because the factors for
review were not those "uniquely suited to the province of trial
courts . . . [appellate] courts should independently review whether the

government's proffered guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the demands of
36
the Clause.
Lilly prompted four additional opinions. The Chief Justice, joined by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, disagreed with both of the plurality's
conclusions.3"7 Justices Scalia and Thomas each wrote separately. Justice Scalia
reminds his colleagues that the confrontation issue in this case could easily be
resolved by their prior formulations because the case involved a witness "who
actually testifies at trial."30 8 The fourth opinion, penned by Justice Breyer, may
prove to be the most important.
Justice Breyer noted that the Court's "effort to tie the Clause so directly to
the hearsay rule ' 309 could be faulted for being both too broad and too narrow,
excluding some hearsay "only tangentially related to the elements in
dispute,, 310 because it did not fit under a hearsay exception, while allowing
some hearsay into evidence that amounted to a "modem Lord Cobham[ J"
statement3. Most poignantly, Justice Breyer rhetorically questioned whether
the Sixth Amendment should be read "principally [to] protect[]
'trustworthiness,"' rather than to require (or at least allow) confrontation 1 2
Because Justice Breyer found the confrontation violation in Lilly to be obvious,

would the obligation of an oath' and cross-examination at trial." Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126 (citations
omitted).
304. Id. at 134. It was this part of the plurality opinion that most alarmed the Chief Justice
who wrote in his concurrence that the plurality had completely banned "the government's use
ofaccomplice confessions that inculpate a codefendant." Id.at 145 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Of course, as the plurality noted, the Chief Justice's observation was incorrect since the
statement would still be admissible ifit satisfied the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
test. See id. at 134-35 n.5.
305. Id. at 137.
306. Id.
307. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
308. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the case as "a paradigmatic
Confrontation Clause violation").
309. Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring).
310. Id. at 142.

311. Id. at 141.
312. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
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he did not explore the dubious link between hearsay and confrontation.
However, he did note "this case does not end the matter. It may leave the
question open for another day."3 3 That day has arrived.
IV. APPROACHES TO CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS

As has been seen in the previous section, the Court has approached
confrontation claims differently depending on whether the claim involved
hearsay evidence, Bruton testimony, limits on cross-examination, or the use of
protective devices. However, at times the Court has interchanged rationales.
Therefore, absolute delineation of approaches is impossible, but this section
will describe and critique some of the approaches the Court has used to
interpret the provisions of the Confrontation Clause.
A. Common-Law Rights Approach
The Supreme Court, and dozens of state courts, frequently have suggested
that the Confrontation Clause was intended to bestow those rights enjoyed in
England at the time of the passage of the Bill of Rights," 4 a claim often
repeated by historians and scholars.31 This so-called "modem Lord Cobham"
interpretation has resulted in restricted views of the Confrontation Clause that
suggest its sole purpose is to prohibit trials based upon ex parte affidavits or
depositions." 6 That this interpretation is flawed is evident from the Supreme
Court's first confrontation case. In United States v. Reid"1 7 Chief Justice Taney
wrote that the "rules of evidence in criminal cases [] are the rules which were
in force in the respective States when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed."3"'
While Chief Justice Taney noted Congress's ability to change those rules, so
long as the changes did not conflict with the federal Constitution, he found no
legislative change that applied to the facts in Reid.3" 9

313. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142-43.
314. For example, inMattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895), Mr. Justice Brown
began on solid ground with the recognition that "[w]e are bound to interpret the Constitution in

light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted." However, he lost historical footing when
he proclaimed that the law "secur[es] to every individual [rights] such as he had already
possessed as a British subject-such as his ancestors had inherited and defended since the days
of Magna Charta." Id.
315. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 141.
316. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); Kirby v. United States, 174

U.S. 47, 61 (1899); Dowdell v.United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911).
317. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).

318. Id. at 366.
319. The defendant relied upon a Virginia statute passed in 1849 that declared witnesses
who were not tried jointly with a defendant were competent to testify. Id. at 362. The Court's
affirmance was based on two conclusions. First, the Court held that evidence issues in federal
criminal trials were determined by the state criminal evidence law in effect at the time of the
passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id. at 363. Secondly, the Court concluded that "no law of
a State made since 1789 [] can affect the mode of proceeding or the rules of evidence in criminal
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The Reid decision repudiates any notion that the Confrontation Clause
must be interpreted as coexistent with English common law. First, the decision
was written and endorsed by those with the most direct knowledge of the
country's formation, the adoption of constitutional principles, and the reaction
to the abuses of English law. Chief Justice Taney carefully pointed out that
while the colonists brought with them the cherished right of a trial by jury, they
fortified that right in criminal cases in ways that differed greatly from the
English practice.32 ° The value of the right to trial by jury in criminal cases in
England, in Chief Justice Taney's words, "was much impaired by the mode of
32
proceeding.""
This reference was to the absence of counsel, compulsory
process, and presentation of witnesses.322
Second, Reid expressly noted that the federal Confrontation Clause was
intended to embrace the practices that the states had adopted under their own
constitutions and for their court systems.323 Neither the formation of the federal
judiciary nor the passage of early federal criminal laws affected the state
procedures. In fact, the Judiciary Act of 1789, in some provisions, specifically
provided that federal courts were to be governed by state procedures.324
Thus, the rights in the Bill of Rights, including the right to confrontation,
should be interpreted consistent with state constitutions and the state court
procedures in effect prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, rather than in
accord with English common law or practice. The Court elaborated:
This oppressive mode of proceeding [in England] had
been abolished in England and the Colonies also by different
statutes before the declaration of independence. But the
memory of the abuses which had been practised under it had
not passed away. And the thirteen Colonies who united in the
declaration of independence, as soon as they became States,
placed in their respective constitutions or fundamental laws,
safeguards against the restoration of proceedings which were

cases .... " Id. at 366.
320. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 363-64.
321. Id. at 364.
322. Id.
323. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 365. In referring to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the
Crimes Act of 1790, Chief Justice Taney noted that "neither of these acts make any express
provision concerning the mode of conducting the trial after the jury are sworn. They do not
prescribe any rule by which it is to be conducted, nor the testimony by which the guilt or
innocence of the party is to be determined." Id.
324. The Court stated:
And as the courts of the United States were in these respects to be governed
by the laws of the several States, it would seem necessarily to follow that

the same principles were to prevail throughout the trial: and that they were
to be governed in like manner, in the ulterior proceedings after the jury was
sworn, where there was no law of Congress to the contrary.
Id. at 366.
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so oppressive and odious while they remained in force. It was
the people of these thirteen states which formed the
Constitution of the United States, and ingrafted on it the
provision which secures the trial by jury . . . . And the
provisions in the Constitution ... are substantially the same
with those which had been previously adopted in the several
States. They were overlooked.., as originally framed. But as
soon as the public attention was called to the fact, that the
securities for a fair and impartial trial by jury in criminal
cases had not been inserted among the cardinal principles of.
the new government, they hastened to amend it, and to secure
to a party accused of an offense against the United States, the
same mode of trial, and the same mode of proceeding, that
had been previously established and practised in the courts of
the several States.
It was for this purpose that 325
the 5th and 6th amendments
were added to the Constitution.
At first glance, it may seem atypical to think about a federal constitutional
right defined by state courts. But that is in fact the required approach, albeit an
approach that would become largely ignored by the Supreme Court.
The clear, language of Reid was soon misused in an opinion that would be
frequently cited by the Supreme Court in its Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.3 26 The Court's rationale in Mattox v. United States,327 rather than
the outcome of the case, offers some explanation for the Court's misapplication
of existing English common law principles to narrow confrontation rights.
The Mattox decision contains several erroneous statements that have
hampered Confrontation Clause analysis. The first significant blunder was the
Court's discussion of the historical basis for the right of confrontation. In
discussing the Court's duty to interpret the Constitution generally, the Court
opined:
We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of
the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as
reaching out for new guaranties of the rights of the citizen,
but as securing to every individual such as he already
possessed as a British subject-such as his ancestors had
inherited and defended since the days of Magna Charta.
Many of its provisions in the nature of a Bill of Rights are

325. Id. at 364.
326. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
327. Id.
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subject to exceptions, recognized long before the adoption of
the Constitution, and not interfering at all with its spirit.328
The inapplicability of this passage to an analysis of American
confrontation rights, which were largely nonexistent in England and were
intentionally largely expanded in the states, was as obvious as it was harmful.
By suggesting that the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was restricted
to the rights colonists possessed as British Subjects, the Court not only misread
history, but also severely limited future interpretations of the right of
confrontation. Implicit in this restricted view was the notion that the colonists,
in forming a new country, could (or at least did) guarantee only those rights
formerly guaranteed them or their ancestors in England under the provisions of
the Magna Charta.
Such a suggestion was in fact preposterous. The Bill of Rights had been
specifically penned in order to assert clearly many rights that were not honored
in England.329 The new country had been formed in large part in reaction to the
absence of those rights. And most assuredly, the new country had been formed
out of a fear of government, not a desire to create a stronger, more powerful
one. The Court's choice of language, suggesting that rights were given to
citizens, rather than taken from government,33 directly contradicted much of
the Constitution and history as well.
This idea of a constitutional right that could absorb no more than what
American citizens had enjoyed as British subjects was unfortunately one that
the Court would draw upon often in justifying governmental action in
contradiction of the literal terms of the Confrontation Clause. The Mattox
decision is cited frequently as authority for restrictions on confrontation.33 '
The second error that crept into interpretations of the Confrontation Clause
as a result of misstatements in Mattox was as unfortunate as the first. The Court
incorrectly assumed and stated that the "primary object" of the Clause was to
disallow "depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted
'
in civil cases, [from] being used against the prisoner."332
Undoubtedly this
statement by the Court in 1895, repeated almost routinely through the next
century, is the basis of the common misjoinder of Sir Walter Raleigh and the
American Confrontation Clause.

328. Id. at 243.
329. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776-1791, at 3, 12
(1983); see also Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation. What Next?, ITExAs TECH L. REV.

67, 73-74 (1969).
330. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-45.
331. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citing Mattox); Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (same); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (same).
332. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242.
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B. Language-BasedApproach
Most interpretations of the Confrontation Clause assume that the literal
language of the Clause is so indefinite as to be undecipherable. The Sixth
Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
333
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
Presumably, the most indefinite term in the short clause is the verb "confront."
Based on this asserted indefiniteness, courts have rushed to interpret the term,
but have rarely looked at legislative history, perhaps because of its sparseness.
The wholesale acceptance of "confront" as an undecipherable term should
not go unchallenged. Most dictionaries define the term simply as "to face; stand
or meet face to face.

334

In some, the definition is even simpler: "to bring (a

person) face to face (with). 335 In reality, the term is not ambiguous in the least.
Perhaps the reason that judges have insisted that it is indefinite is the
implication of giving it so simple a meaning. To do so would permit that which
no Supreme Court has fathomed possible-if an accused were literally given
the right to stand face-to-face with the witnesses against him, hearsay evidence
would be excluded in criminal trials.
The Sixth Amendment that James Madison originally submitted to the
states in 1789 read as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with his accusers and with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.336

With no real explanation in the historical record, the Committee of Eleven
who considered the proposal deleted the language "with his accusers" and left
'
At least three
the remaining language "with the witnesses against him."337
suggested explanations are given.
That the deletion was accidental is unlikely given the amount of time that
passed between the submission and passage.338 If the deletion were intentional,

333. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
334. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 308 (College ed. 1960).

335. Id.
336. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Reading the Text of the Confrontation Clause: "To Be " or
"Not to Be? ", U. PA. J. CONST. L. 722, 738 (2001) (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1789)).

337. Id. at 738-39.
338. More than two and one-half years passed between submission on June 8, 1789 and
adoption on December 15,1791 (describing practices leading up to passage of confrontation
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perhaps it was to simplify the language based on a belief that the phrases were
redundant. Alternatively, an intentional deletion might have been prompted by
just the opposite concern, specifically, a desire to allow confrontation of
witnesses, but not of accusers. This is unlikely since in England, accusers,
because of the essential nature of their information, had to be sworn before
testifying, but witnesses did not.339 If this were the intended distinction, then the
right of confrontation would apply only to witnesses, with less crucial
information, but not to accusers with the essential, incriminating information.
If one considers the deleted language in light of the language of state
constitutions in existence when the Bill of Rights was proposed, the
simplification explanation seems the most likely. Virginia, Delaware, and
North Carolina used the terms "witnesses" and "accusers," while New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, Maryland, and Pennsylvania used the
simpler version." No case law suggests that the right to confront was different,
for example, in Virginia than it was in Pennsylvania. The drafters most likely
decided that the shorter, simpler version conveyed exactly the same rights as
the longer, more cumbersome one.
Some states vested their citizens with a more literal confrontation right
based on more precise language in their state constitutions. For example, in
Montana the state supreme court analyzed Montana's confrontation clause to
provide broader rights than those interpreted to exist by virtue of the federal
provision.34 Other courts, despite identical language in the state constitutions,
have made more subtle differentiations.342

clauses in
339.
340.
341.

the Federal and state Constitutions).
See generally Larkin, supra note 3, at 72-78.
See Larkin, supra note 3, at 75-76.
For example, Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, subject to the right of the state to have a
change of venue for any of the causes for which the defendant may obtain
the same.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24. Based on the different language, the Montana Supreme Court has
consistently held that:
Unlike its federal counterpart, the text of Montana's Confrontation
Clause specifically guarantees the accused's right "to meet the witnesses
against him face to face." As we [have] noted the 1972 Montana
Constitution and subsequent cases analyzing the Confrontation Clause have
made it abundantly clear that full cross-examination is a critical aspect of
the right of confrontation." Moreover, we have recognized that the rights
contained in the Declaration ofRights, which include the rights guaranteed
to an accused person in a criminal prosecution, are fundamental rights.
State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (Mont. 1998) (quoting State v. Young, 815 P.2d 590, 592
(Mont. 1991)).
342. The Tennessee Constitution provides:
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Another language-based interpretation is Justice Scalia's, which is more
fully discussed in Part IV. To Justice Scalia, a "witness," for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment, is one who gives testimony at trial.3 43 Thus, the right to
confront the witnesses means only that the accused has the right to confront
those whom the state chooses to call to testify at the trial of the case.
Justice Scalia's approach depends on a rigid interpretation of the clause
"witnesses against him." 3" This approach selectively chooses a definition of
the term "witness," which is neither favored nor sensible. The interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause that results from this limited definition of the word
"witness" is practically indefensible. The interpretation empowers the State to
void the right entirely by proving its case through hearsay exceptions. The
interpretation must be coupled with an historic approach, the exclusion of
depositions and ex parte affidavits as proof, to have any validity. While this
approach asserts a language-based foundation, its supporters concede the
Clause must also exclude proof that otherwise would not be forbidden under
the literal language of the Clause.
The need to supplement the literal language approach was exemplified by
the government in the Court's protective devices cases. After the Court
declined the government's offer to construe the Clause as only prohibiting ex
parte affidavits, the government suggested a supplemented approach in its brief
in White v. Illinois.45 The brief suggested that the Court adopt Justice Scalia's
language approach, with his definition of witness, but that the Court
supplement that approach with the prohibition of ex parte affidavits.3 46 Thus,
the federal government, as amicus curiae in the White case, suggested that the
Clause "apply only to those persons who provide in-court testimony or the
functional equivalent, such as affidavits, depositions, or confessions that are
made in contemplation of legal proceedings. 347
The rationale behind this approach is obscure. Certainly, this rationale is
not based upon history or precedent. It is not supported by the language of the
clause. Perhaps, it is best explained as an advocate's attempt to find the most

That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right to be heard by

himself and his counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, and to have a copy thereof, to meet the witnesses face to face,

to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and in

TENN.

prosecutions by indictment or presentment, a speedy public trial, by an
impartial jury of the County in which the crime shall have been committed,
and shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.
CONST. art. 1, § 9. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that "[tihe 'face-to-face'

language found in the Tennessee Constitution ... impose[s] a higher right than that found in the
federal constitution." State v. Deuter, 839 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tenn. 1992).

343. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
344. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

345. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (describing the position taken in the
government's brieo.
346. Id. at 352-53; see Brief for Respondent, White, 1991 WL 527595.
347. White, 502 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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restrictive approach that would garner the requisite five votes from the Court.
The government had little hope of getting the Court to back away from the
notion that the Clause prohibited ex parte affidavits. History and precedent
support an interpretation of the Clause that excludes ex parte affidavits. Of the
remaining alternatives, the most palatable to the government-the one that
allows the most unconfronted evidence at trial-was Justice Scalia's approach,
particularly in light of Craig.In effect, had the government been successful in
persuading the Court to adopt the approach it suggested in White, only ex parte
affidavits would actually be excluded under the Confrontation Clause.
Witnesses could avoid becoming witnesses subject to actual confrontation,
under Justice Scalia's definition of "witness," by asserting the traumatic effect
of being forced to give testimony in the presence of the defendant.
C. Fundamental,InterdependentRights Approach
In the very first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the
Confrontation Clause, the Court viewed confrontation rights as a bundle of
interdependent rights necessary for accomplishing a fair criminal trial. In the
1851 Reid decision, the Supreme Court recognized the connection between the
right to a trial by jury and other constitutional rights, including the right to
confrontation. A right to a jury trial absent those other guarantees was an
"oppressive mode of proceeding.""34 Thus, the rights bundled in the
Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, including the right to trial by jury, counsel, confrontation,
and compulsory process were viewed, at least temporarily, as interdependent;
restricting or interfering with one compromised all of the others.
Similarly, in Kirby v. United States,349 the Court celebrated the importance
of the confrontation provision, deeming it"[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees
of life and liberty."35 Seemingly important to the Kirby Court was the interplay
between the "fundamental" confrontation right and the adversarial nature of the
American criminal justice system.3 51 Because Kirby was denied his right to
confrontation, the presumption of innocence, which "has relation to every fact
that must be established in order to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt"
was of "no consequence. "352

348. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 364 (1851).
349. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
350. Id. at 55.
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be
proved against an accused--charged with a different offence, . . . except
by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while
being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he
may impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules governing
the trial or conduct of criminal cases."
Id.
351. See id.
352. Id.
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This interdependent rights approach was not the creation of Chief Justice
Taney, who authored the Reid decision, nor of the Reid or Kirby Court. Four
decades earlier, another Chief Justice had interpreted confrontation, counsel,
compulsory process, and jury trial as a bundle of interdependent rights.
Fulfilling his responsibilities as a circuit justice," 3 Chief Justice John Marshall
presided over the trial of Aaron Burr in the Virginia district court in the early
1800s.354 At trial, the prosecution asked a man named Neale about
conversations he had with Herman Blannerhasset that implicated Burr.355 The
prosecution argued that the evidence was admissible since Blannerhasset and
Burr were co-conspirators, thereby making Blannerhasset's declarations
admissible evidence against Burr.356
Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as trial judge, began his ruling on the
evidence with the following pronouncement:
The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony,
which excludes from trials of a criminal or civil nature the
declarations of any other individual than of him against
whom the proceedings are instituted, has been generally
deemed all essential to the correct administration of
justice. ... I know of no principle in the preservation of
which all are more concerned. I know none, by undermining
which, life, liberty, and property, might be more endangered.
It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of every
inroad on a principle so truly important.35 7
In the end, Marshall denied the use of the hearsay evidence stating repeatedly
that "the declarations of third persons not forming a part of the transaction, and
in the presence of the accused, cannot be received in evidence in this
not made
358
case."

353. When the federal judiciary was created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, six justices were
named to serve as Justices of the Supreme Court, but also to travel the country and sit as trial and
appellate judges as well. Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the
Federal Judiciary, 46 VILL. L. REv. 745, 754 (2001) (citations omitted). Because of the
hardships of the tasks, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801 which ended the circuit-riding
responsibilities of the Justices and created circuit judge positions. Id. A lame-duck Congress
filled the circuitjudge positions with federalistjudges, which displeased newly elected president
Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 754-55. When Jefferson questioned the appointment of sixteen new
judges, members of Congress introduced legislation in 1802 to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801.

Id. at 755. Despite a vigorous debate over the constitutionality of the repealing legislation, it
passed, restoring the Justices to their circuit-riding responsibilities and eliminating the sixteen
new federal judgeships. Id.
354. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
355. Id. at 193.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 193.
358. Id. at 198, 201.
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As was true forty-four years later when Chief Justice Taney first wrote for
the Supreme Court on the topic of the Confrontation Clause, what was
important about Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Burr was not the outcome
but the rationale. Marshall, writing less than two decades after the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, recognized that confrontation was essential to the
administration of justice and that undermining the right endangered the very
core values that the Framers had intended to protect, namely, life, liberty, and
359
property.

The modem Supreme Court embraced an interdependent rights
interpretation in a case in which it applied the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause to the states. 360 In Pointerv. Texas36' the Court reiterated
that confrontation was a "fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution. '362 In a preview of what later became the more favored approach,
a functional analysis of the Confrontation Clause, the Court added that the "the
363
right of cross examination is included in [that] right.

359. Id. at 193.
360. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause incorporated the rights of the Sixth Amendment as applicable against the states).
Only two years before Pointer,in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), the Court
held that "a provision of the Bill of Rights, which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."
361. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
362. Id. at 404.
363. Id. (emphasis added).
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36
The Court in Pointer relied on five previous decisions 4 to connect the
"right of confrontation and cross-examination" and to characterize them as
"essential and fundamental requirement[s] for the kind of fair trial, which is this
country's constitutional goal. 3 65 The Court linked confrontation and crossexamination rights to the right to a trial by jury as had the Reid Court. In
366
support of the linkage, the Court cited Turner v. Louisiana, a cross-

364. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691
(1931); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
In Alford defense counsel was denied the opportunity to cross-examine a government
witness as to his present address on the grounds of relevance. 282 U.S. at 689-90. Counsel
asserted his belief that the witness was in federal custody and that this information was relevant
to bias or prejudice. In overturning the decision, the Court stated bluntly that "[c]rossexamination of a witness is a matter of right." 282 U.S. at 691. The Supreme Court discounted
the trial judge's rationale that he had a duty to protect the witness. "[N]o obligation is imposed
on the court, such as that suggested below, to protect a witness from being discredited on crossexamination, short of an attempted invasion of his constitutional protection from selfincrimination, properly invoked." Id. at 694.
Oliver was a federal habeas case arising out of a state court's order finding Oliver in
contempt and sentencing him to jail as a result of his testimony at a "One-Man Grand Jury"
proceeding allowed by Michigan law. 333 U.S. at 260. The judge, based upon Oliver's testimony
and the testimony of other witnesses given in secret to the judge, concluded that Oliver had been
untruthful. The Supreme Court found that this procedure violated due process. Id. at 273.
In Greene petitioner challenged on due process grounds a governmental policy that kept
classified information confidential. 379 U.S. at 475-76. In this non-criminal setting, the Court
uttered some of its most firm comments about the importance of cross-examination.
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in ourj urisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings,
the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the
individual so that he has an opportunity to show what is untrue. While this
is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important
where the evidence consists ofthe testimony of individuals whose memory
might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by
malice ....We have formalized these protections in the requirements of

confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find
expression in the Sixth Amendment ....
Greene, 360 U.S. at 496 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (finding Confrontation
Clause violation when preliminary hearing testimony of codefendant used by government
although the codefendant was in government custody and could have been brought to trial to
testify)); and In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The "ancient roots" to which the Court referred
were those of Paul and Festus told in Acts 25:16. Greene, 360 U.S. at 496 n.25.
365. 380 U.S. at 405 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). In Oliver, the Court
described the rights as "basic in our system ofjurisprudence." 333 U.S. at 273.
366. 379 U.S. 466 (1965). The Turner case involved a claim that due process was violated
by sequestering a jury under the command of two deputies, the key witnesses against the
defendant who was on trial for a capital offense. Id. at 467-68. The Court noted that "it would
be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association
throughout the trial between the jurors and these two key witnesses for the prosecution." Id. at
473.
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examination case of the same term."' Turner held that "trial by jury in a
criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the 'evidence developed'
against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom
where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation,
36
of cross-examination, and of counsel." 1
In the confrontation case that followed Pointer,the Court adhered to the
interdependent rights approach. In Barber v. Page,3 69 decided just three years
after Pointer,the Court again recognized the significance of confrontation and,
arguably, disposed of the earlier idea that the purpose of the Confrontation
Clause was only to protect against convictions based on ex parte affidavits.
Justice Marshall, writing for an unanimous court, quoted from Pointer:
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and
other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their
expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and crossexamination is37 an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal.37'
Despite this interdependent rights approach used in Barberand Pointer,the
Court laid the groundwork for what emerged as a more favored view of the
Confrontation Clause, the functional approach.372 In Pointer, the Court
reminded the parties that the Confrontation Clause had exceptions, but that
those exceptions were limited to situations in which a witness was not available
to testify.373

367. 380 U.S. at 405.
368. Pointer,380 U.S. at 405 (quoting Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73).
369. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
370. Even the use of the verb "is" suggests an inextricable linkage between confrontation
and cross-examination.
371. Barber, 390 U.S. at 721 (quoting Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 202-42.
373. 380 U.S. at 407. The Court cited Mantox as a case that allowed the admission of dying
declarations and previous testimony of a deceased witness. Id. Mattox, of course, only involved
the latter. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text. However, what is more telling is the
Court's attachment to the signal compare to the citation from Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458 (1900). Id. The Motes Court found a Confrontation Clause violation when former testimony
of a witness and codefendant was admitted notwithstanding that his "absence was manifestly due
to the negligence of the officers of the Government." 178 U.S. at 471. The discussion focused
upon the various reasons for a witness's absence. Id. at 473-74. When the Motes citation is
compared, as directed, with the statement in Pointerthat precedes it ("The case before us would
be quite a different one had Phillips' statement been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which
petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate
opportunity to cross-examine." 380 U.S. at 407), the obvious conclusion is that "situations which
might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of witnesses,"
380 U.S. at 407, depend upon whether cross-examination had occurred and the reason for the
witness's absence.
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D. FunctionalApproach
1. The Clause's Function
Just as Pointerhad intimated, the Court began to analyze the Confrontation

Clause in terms of whether the function of the right had been satisfied. This
analysis necessarily depended upon the chosen view of the Clause's history.
The more restricted alternative views the clause's function as it was misstated
in Mattox-to prohibit convictions based upon ex parte affidavits and

depositions. Under this functional approach, confrontation rights are violated
only when evidence is offered via depositions or ex parte affidavits. Recently,
in Lilly, a plurality suggested that even under a restrictive functional approach,
accomplice confessions (which are notably neither ex parte affidavits or
depositions) should ordinarily not be admissible.374

A more generous functional approach views the Clause as essential to the
right to a trial by jury, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof.
Under this approach, the function of confrontation is to assure that witnesses
testify in the presence of the accused, face-to-face with the jury, subject to
cross-examination."' This view of confrontation is based on several premises.
One is that witnesses who must testify under oath in the presence of the
accused and the jury in a formal setting are more likely to be truthful, because
they are subject to the penalties of perjury and are made aware of the
importance of their testimony. A second premise is that the defense, through
cross-examination, has the opportunity to reveal inconsistencies and
implausibilities in the testimony and can demonstrate bias or motive of the
witnesses. The jury, whose ultimate job is to determine the facts of the case,
may see the witnesses during testimony and cross-examination and observe
their demeanor and attitude, all of which aids the jury in determining
credibility. Under this functional approach, confrontation entitles the accused
to cross-examine the witness in the presence of the jury.
Juxtaposed between these two approaches is a third approach that asserts
the Confrontation Clause is intended to assure the right to cross-examination.
If the defense cross-examined, or had an opportunity to cross-examine, the
witness at any time, presumably in a formal setting, confrontation has been
satisfied. Cross-examination need not occur in the presence of the jury, and it
need not have the ability to be. Opportunity to cross-examine is the key. This
has become a favored approach in the Supreme Court's modem Confrontation
Clause analysis.
374. They may be admitted if they can satisfy the circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness test. See supra notes 296-306 and accompanying text.
375. See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationofthe Confrontation
Clause: A Proposalfor a ProsecutorialRestraint Model, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 557, 613 (1992)
("[T]he failure to hold statements elicited by the prosecution to a higher standard ofadmissibility
defeats the objective of protecting the individual against the power of the government and
interferes with the jury's historical function of guarding our civil liberties.").

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 537

To accept the proposition that a previous cross-examination somehow
satisfies confrontation at trial ignores the realities of trial practice. When ajury
is read a previous witness examination, the entire context of the examination
is absent. Factors such as the witness's tone of voice, quickness of response,
and nonverbal cues are replaced with the often monotonous recitation of
counsel. In addition, the jury is deprived of observing the witness under crossexamination. Does the witness maintain eye contact with the cross-examiner?
Does the witness fidget, sweat, or breathe irregularly? The entire exchange
between cross-examiner and witness is supplanted with a cold, dry transcript.
2. Refinement of the Functional Approach - Function Once
Removed, ReliabilityPlus ConstitutionalUnavailability
Once the Court accepted that the function of the Confrontation Clause was
to assure the right of cross-examination, the functional approach lent itself to
further refinement. If the function of the Clause is to assure the right of crossexamination, then confrontation is satisfied if the function of cross-examination
is satisfied. The function of cross-examination is to test the reliability of the
evidence.376 From almost the beginning of its use of this new functional
approach, the Court ignored all but the verbal aspects of cross-examination.
Thus, the Court concluded that any cross-examination, or any opportunity for
cross-examination, satisfied the Confrontation Clause. Under this approach, the
Court is not concerned about the timing or nature of cross-examination. Any
cross-examination is sufficient, regardless of whether it occurred in the
presence of the jury or at a preliminary hearing far in advance of trial. In the
Court's view, only a complete denial of cross-examination violates the
Confrontation Clause.
The adoption of this approach led the Court down a slippery slope that it
had previously avoided. For decades the Court had refused to equate the
Confrontation Clause with the rules of evidence. Thus, a confrontation
challenge and a hearsay challenge required different analyses. A determination
that evidence was admissible under hearsay rules did not necessarily mean that
the evidence satisfied the Confrontation Clause. Separate inquiries were
required.
Once the Court shifted from a functional approach that focused on
confrontation to a functional approach that focused on cross-examination, this
often-repeated observation began to erode. The Court reasoned that both crossexamination and the exclusion of hearsay evidence served the same purpose:
to assure reliable evidence. Yet, the hearsay rule yielded many exceptions
based on the inherent reliability of certain hearsay. If evidence was inherently
reliable, the need to test its reliability by cross-examination was reduced, if not

376. Cross-examination has been referred to, even by the United States Supreme Court,
as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citation omitted).
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totally removed. Similarly, if evidence was inherently reliable, an inquiry into
whether a denial of cross-examination resulted in the admission of unreliable
evidence was superfluous.
The Court's frequent admonishment that satisfaction of the hearsay rule did
not necessarily satisfy the Confrontation Clause was no longer accurate.
Instead, in the vast majority of cases, a court that utilized the equation "Hearsay
Exception = Confrontation Satisfaction" would rule correctly.
However, some of the Court's prior decisions had seemingly barred a pure
reliability-based functional approach. The bar was provided by the Court's
discussion of the witness's unavailability. In Barberand in Mancusi v. Stubbs
the Court required that the hearsay evidence be necessary before it could
substitute for in-court testimony. In both of those cases, the prior testimony was
subjected to cross-examination in the presence of the jury at a prior trial.377
Similarly, in both, the use of prior testimony was necessitated by the current
unavailability of the witness. In Barber, because the State had not made a
good-faith effort to procure the witness, the prior, cross-examined testimony
was not allowed. 78 But in Mancusi the witness was living abroad and the State
could not compel the witness's return to the United States.379 Under those
circumstances, the presumptively reliable former testimony was admitted.3"'
An objective reading of Roberts, the case following Barberand Mancusi,
suggests that the Court had devised a two-prong test for evaluating whether
otherwise admissible hearsay evidence was admissible in the face of a
confrontation challenge.3"' The first prong excluded hearsay evidence that was
not countenanced with trustworthiness. Even trustworthy hearsay would be
excluded if the use of the evidence was not necessary. 382 The second prong,
necessity, was as an equally mandatory prerequisite for admission. "[T]he Sixth
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case . . . the

of, the
prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability
383
defendant.
the
against
use
to
wishes
it
statement
whose
declarant
The majority's assertion that necessity, referred to as unavailability, was
a constitutionalrequirementwas not ambiguous. It was direct. Furthermore, it
was the basis of the dissent. 384 Before out-of-court statements could be

377. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,720 (1986); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204,21314 (1972).
378. See 390 U.S. at 725.
379. 408 U.S at 209.
380. Id. at 216.
381. See 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
382. Id.
383. Id. (citations omitted).
384. See id. at 77-82. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion with which Justices
Stevens and Marshall joined. The relatively short opinion is based on the dissenter's
disagreement with the factual conclusions reached by the majority on the issue of unavailability.
"As the Court recognizes, however, the Constitution imposes the threshold requirement that the
prosecution must demonstrate the unavailability of the witness whose prerecorded testimony it
wishes to use against the defendant. Because I cannot agree that the State has met its burden of
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introduced against a defendant at trial, the State was required to satisfy both the
constitutional necessity requirement, by establishing unavailability, and the
trustworthiness requirement, by establishing the inherent reliability of the outof-court statement." 5 While there remained cohesive arguments about whether
this test satisfied the purposes of confrontation, the two-prong test guaranteed
that the exceptional case would be one in which a defendant was convicted
based upon out-of-court testimony. For that to occur, the prosecution had to
satisfy a threshold requirement of necessity.
3. Further Refinement of the Functional Approach-Reliability
Alone
The functional approach based on reliability and necessity was quickly
replaced with an approach based ostensibly on reliability alone. In United
States v. Inadi386 the majority of the Court asserted that "Roberts... does not
stand for such a wholesale revision of the law of evidence [that would require
the government to establish the unavailability of the witness], nor does it
support such a broad interpretation of the Confrontation Clause."387 Reasoning
that the Court only decided the case before it and did not offer answers to
questions not posed by the case, the Court concluded that the necessity rule
discussed in Roberts applied only to prior testimony cases and did not stand for
the "radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the
government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.""3 ' Thus, the
Constitution did not require a showing of unavailability prior to the admission
of a co-conspirator's statements against an accused criminal.
While the Inadi majority took care to confine its decision to the facts
before it, that is, whether unavailability was a prerequisite to the introduction
of co-conspirator's statements, the Court eventually asserted a more universal
rule dispensing with unavailability. In White v. Illinois. 9 the Supreme Court
analyzed both aspects of the Confrontation Clause that it had addressed in
Roberts. As to the first, constitutional necessity, the Court said what it could
have said in Inadi-the Constitution requires the State to establish
unavailability only when the out-of-court statements were made in the course
of a judicial proceeding.39

establishing this predicate, I dissent." Id. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan went
on to make it clear that because he disagreed with the majority's factual finding on the threshold
issue, he was not reaching the issue of whether the testimony met the reliability requirement. Id.
at 77 n.I.
385. See id. at 65.
386. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).

387. Id. at 392.
388. Id. at 394.
389. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
390. Id. at 354 (citation omitted).
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After White the test for determining whether hearsay statements are
admissible notwithstanding a Confrontation Clause challenge is, in essence, a
functional test based exclusively on reliability. Reliability can, in turn, be
established in either of two ways. If the out-of-court statement fits under a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, it satisfies the indicia of reliability
requirement, by definition, and is admissible notwithstanding a Confrontation
Clause challenge.39' This is because of the "weight accorded longstanding
judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain
types of out-of-court statements. ' 3 92 The firmly rooted hearsay standard is a
strict one. Statements "whose conditions have proved over time 'to remove all
temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as
would the obligation of an oath' and cross-examination at a trial" are firmly
rooted.393
If the statement does not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, then
the statement is admissible, despite confrontation objections, only if it bears
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' '394 Again, the test for compliance
is strict:
When a court can be confident-as in the context of hearsay
falling within a firmly rooted exception-that "the declarant's
truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances
that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal
utility," the Sixth Amendment's residual "trustworthiness"
test allows the admission of the declarant's statements.395
Only when the statement is prior testimony from a judicial proceeding is
the State required to establish constitutional necessity.396 Constitutional
necessity is established by demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant. 397
Based on undisturbed prior rulings, that test seemingly turns on the good-faith
efforts of the state to produce the declarant at trial. Unavailability had been
discussed in the context of lost witnesses, dead witnesses, Fifth-Amendment
asserting witnesses, forgetful witnesses, witnesses outside the court's
jurisdiction, screened witnesses, and uncalled witnesses.398 Some dicta suggests
391. Id. at 356.
392. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).
393. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 244 (1895)).
394. Id. at 125 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
395. Id. at 136 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 820).
396. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992).
397. See id.
398. See id. at 350 (uncalled witnesses); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (screened
witnesses); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (forgetful witnesses); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980) (lost witnesses); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (witnesses outside the
court's jurisdiction); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (Fifth Amendment-claiming
witnesses); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (dead witnesses).
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that constitutional necessity may yield to a benefits-burden or utility test, but
it seems at least certain that the State must make a good-faith attempt to make
the witness available.3 9 Although the Court has flirted with the definition of
unavailability set forth in widely-accepted evidence rules, the Court has never
specifically equated constitutional necessity and unavailability with
unavailability as defined in Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its
state counterparts.400 However, there is little reason to suspect that the same
definitions would not apply, especially since the Court has in effect equated the
constitutional right with the rule of evidence.
When the State claims that the evidence is admissible because of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, the judge, in effect, determines
what the jury would determine were the witness present to testify. The judge
decides, in essence, whether cross-examination would do any good. The
problem with this approach is obvious. Judges are trained neutrals, not trained
advocates. Although they may have tried cases before taking the bench, they
have been encouraged, indeed required, to set aside those skills for the more
applicable ones of neutral decision making. The evidentiary ruling they must
make requires not only an advocate's viewpoint, but also a viewpoint from the
advocate who has prepared the case and knows the potential areas for crossexamination of the particular witness. It also requires an understanding of the
trial strategy in the particular case.

399. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (benefits-burden analysis); Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 76-77 (1980) (good-faith showing of unavailability).
400. Federal Rule 804 sets forth the following definition of unavailability:
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been
unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance
or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant isnot unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing
the witness from attending or testifying.
FED. R. EVID. 804.
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E. ParticularJustices'Approaches

Most of the Justices who have written about confrontation rights weave
together pieces of the Court's prior opinions, sometimes haphazardly, in order
to justify their decisions. There are three noteworthy exceptions: Justice
Harlan, Justice Scalia, and to a lesser extent, Justice Thomas.
1.

The Two Approaches of JusticeHarlan

Justice Harlan, who was a member of the Court when the Court was
deciding mostly hearsay cases, expressed two approaches to the Confrontation
Clause. His first view was expressed in his concurring opinion in Californiav.
Green.4"' Justice Harlan later repudiated this view in his concurring opinion in
Dutton v. Evans.40 2

In Green Justice Harlan reached two conclusions that are significant to
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. First, based on a void historical record,
Justice Harlan concluded that the "Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce any
available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial."4 °3
Second, even if the Sixth Amendment were not broad
enough to support that
40 4
conclusion, the Fourteenth Amendment would be.
Justice Harlan's view was prompted by a combination of language, history,
unsupported theories expounded by evidence scholars, and fairness. For
example, he noted that the language of the Clause must be read to confer not
only the right to question witnesses who appear and give evidence at trial, but
also the right to question "extrajudicial" declarants since they are "no less"
witnesses.4 °5 Thus, Justice Harlan concluded that:

From the scant information available it may tentatively
be concluded that the Confrontation Clause was meant to
constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses, trials by
anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses .... [H]aving
established a broad principle, it is ...likely that the Framers

anticipated it would be supplemented, as a matter of judgemade common law, by prevailing rules of evidence.4 6

401. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
402. 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
403. Green, 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring).
404. See id. This portion of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion would be the portion
selected by Justice Scalia in Coy two decades later to form the basis of his Confrontation Clause
approach. However, a close look at Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Green discloses that
Justice Scalia was selective in choosing and applying Justice Harlan's thoughts.
405. Id. at 175.
406. Id. at 179. Justice Harlan offers as support for his conclusion a short debate that took
place during 1789-90 in Congress on the compulsory process portion of the Sixth Amendment.
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Justice Harlan challenged what he believed to be the mistaken, restrictive
reading of the Confrontation Clause to prohibit only the use of ex parte
affidavits and depositions.4 7 Introduction of ex parte affidavits and depositions
was no more, and perhaps less, problematic for the accused than was the
introduction of hearsay. 48 Thus, Justice Harlan concluded that the
Confrontation Clause could best be reconciled with history, language, and
precedent by confining the confrontation guarantee to "an availability rule, one
that requires the production of a witness when he is available to testify."4 9
What I would hold binding on the States as a matter of
due process is what I also deem the correct meaning of the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause-that a State may
not in a criminal case use hearsay when the declarant is
available. There is no reason in fairness why a State should
not, as long as it retains a traditional adversarial trial, produce
a witness and afford the accused an opportunity to crossexamine him when he can be made available. That this
principle is an essential element of fairness is attested to not
only by precedent, but also by the traditional and present
exceptions to the hearsay rule .

. .

. Furthermore it

accommodates the interest of the State in making a case, yet
recognizes the obligation to accord the accused the fullest
opportunity to present his best defense. For those rare cases
where a conviction occurs after a trial where no credible
evidence could be said to justify the result, there remains the
broader due process requirement that a conviction cannot be
founded on no evidence.410
Justice Harlan candidly changed his position on the Confrontation Clause
less than a year later in Dutton v. Evans.411 Justice Harlan began his concurring
opinion by recognizing the difference between confrontation rights and hearsay
rules.4" 2 He continued to adhere to his view, set forth in Green, that they must

Id. at 177. During the debate, the movant was asked how far the State must go in providing
compulsory process, as, for example, when a defendant requests a continuance until a witness
could be produced. The reported answer was that "in securing him the right of compulsory
process, the Government did all it could; the remaindermust lie in the discretion of the court."
Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 756). Another member of Congress answered that the judicial
system would be required to supervise the rule. 1d.
407. 399 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., concurring).
408. Id.
409. Id.
410.
Id. at 186-87 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan also utilized the due
process/unnecessary suggestiveness line of cases to support his conclusion. Id. at n.20 (citing
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)).
411. 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
412. Id. at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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be treated distinctly. Nonetheless,
he accepted Wigmore's view of
413
confrontation as the "correct view":
"The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of
testimonial statements (dying declarations, or the like) shall
be given infra-judicially,--this depends on the law of
Evidence for the time being,-but only what mode of
procedure shall be followed-i.e., a cross-examining
procedure-in the case of such testimony as is required by the
ordinary law of Evidence to be given infra-judicially."
The conversion of a clause intended to regulate trial
procedure into a threat to much of the existing law of
evidence and to future developments in that field is not an
unnatural shift, for the paradigmatic evil the Confrontation
Clause was aimed at-trial by affidavit-can be viewed
almost equally well as a gross violation of the rule against
hearsay and as the giving of evidence by the affiant out of the
presence of the accused and not subject to cross-examination
by him. But however natural the shift may be, once made it
carries the seeds of great mischief for enlightened
development in the law of evidence. 4
In essence, Justice Harlan accepted a benefits-burden approach, arguably
expressing greater concern for the continued development of evidence law than
for protecting a constitutional guarantee. Justice Harlan accepted these
limitations, in part, because he could find no "compelling linguistic or historical
evidence" to suggest otherwise. 5 To his credit, Justice Harlan did not pretend
that his new approach, nor the approach of the Court, was consistent with the
Court's precedent. However, he was satisfied that his approach
was not
"necessarily inconsistent with the results that have been reached. '41 6
2. Justice Scalia's Approach, PartsIand I
Justice Scalia previewed his unique interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause in the Court's first protective devices case. To Justice Scalia, Coy v.
Iowa 417 presented the pure confrontation issue that arose when an accused was
deprived of rights with respect to witnesses actually testifying at trial. The

413. Id.
414. Id. at 94 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 1940)).

415. Id. at 95.
416. Id. at 97. Justice Harlan undertook to demonstrate consistency in the Court's prior
confrontation decisions. When he reached the Kirby decision, unable to argue consistency in
result, he concluded simply that while correctly decided, the legal theory used by the Kirby Court

had simply been "wrong." 400 U.S. at 99.
417. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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explicit guarantee of the Confrontation Clause was the right of the defendant
to "a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."418
'
Relying on one of the Court's earliest Confrontation Clause decisions, Justice
Scalia explained:
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses
cannot be proved against an accused... except by witnesses
who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while
being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose
testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the
established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal
41 9
cases.

The State had as much as conceded the significance of face-to-face
confrontation, the majority held, by relying upon its traumatic effect as a reason
for dispensing with it in the case at bar.42° Since the very purpose of the screen
used by the Iowa trial court was to allow the witnesses against the accused to
avoid seeing the accused, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found it
"difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's
right to a face-to-face encounter."4 ''
Justice Scalia distinguished the Court's prior decision by
"explicit" and "implicit" confrontation rights. The case before delineating
the Court
involved the explicit right to confrontation-it derived from the "irreducible
literal meaning of the Clause" and was an absolute right.422 The other cases
involved rights that flowed from the explicit right to confrontation. These were
implicit rights such as cross-examination. They were not absolute rights but
could be compromised in the event of necessity.423

Within a year, Justice Scalia's implicit-explicit rights test would itself be
tested in Marylandv. Craig.2 4 The protective device in Craig,like the one in
Coy, interfered specifically with the "explicit" right that Justice Scalia had
found in the "irreducible literal meaning" of the Confrontation Clause.425
Dissenting vigorously from the majority's finding of a state interest sufficient
to dispense with physical confrontation, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for

418. Id. at 1016.
419. Id. at 1017 (quoting Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899)).

420. See id. at 1020.
421. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
422. Id. at 1021.
423. Id. at 1020-21. When the opinion addresses whether an exception might exist,
it

suggests that exceptions would depend upon the "showing of necessity," which was not present
in the current case in which the Iowa legislature had imposed a "presumption of trauma." Id. at
1021. The "necessity" language hails from the Roberts decision, more proof that the Court's

refinement of Roberts in Inadiand White was the product of revision, not restatement.
424. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
425. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021; Craig,497 U.S. at 840.
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compromising a right that was "unqualifiedly guaranteed. 426 Justice Scalia
stated:
Seldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain
a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of
prevailing current opinion. The Sixth Amendment provides,
with unmistakable clarity, that "in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be confronted with the

witnesses against him." The purpose of enshrining this
protection in the Constitution was to assure that none of the
many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory
law could overcome a defendant's right to face his or her
accusers incourt....
Whatever else it may mean in addition, the
defendant's constitutional right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" means, always and everywhere, at
to face
least what it explicitly says: the "'right to meet face
427
all those who appear and give evidence at trial.'
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Coy and his dissenting opinion in
Craig clearly establish a viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause neither
suggested nor dictated by the Court's previous decisions. For Justice Scalia, the
Confrontation Clause grants one explicit, absolute right-the right to confront
face-to-face the witnesses that actually appear and testify at the trial. He bases
his opinion on the "literal, unavoidable text" 4 8 of the Sixth Amendment,
selective historical anecdotes, 429 a Latin translation, 430 and Supreme Court
precedent: "[this Court has] never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant431a face-to-face meeting with witnesses
appearing before the trier of fact."

Justice Scalia relies repeatedly on two Supreme Court cases: Kentucky v.
Stincer431 and Kirby v. United States.4 3 3 Both the decisions and the historical

426. Craig,497 U.S. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

427. Id. at 860-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
428. Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
429. Justice Scalia in Coy illustrates his reading of the clause with the words of Roman
Governor Festus in regard to his prisoner, Paul: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver

any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a
chance to defend himself against the charges;" and William Shakespeare: "Then call them to our
presence-face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the
accused freely speak ..." 487 U.S. at 1015-16 (quoting Acts 25:16; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
RICHARD II, act 1, sc.l).
430. According to Justice Scalia, the Latin prefix "con" comes from "contra" meaning
"against" or "opposed;" the root "frons" means "forehead." Id. at 1016.
431. Id. (citations omitted).
432. 482 U.S. 730 (1987). Justice Scalia actually cites the dissenting opinion in Stincer,
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anecdotes utilized by Justice Scalia go further than the Justice would ultimately
434
go, as evidenced by his dissenting opinion in Craig.
In Coy, his initial writing on the Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia stated
that the Confrontation Clause provides the right to the accused (1) to confront
face-to-face those witnesses who appear and testify at trial and (2) to have facts
introduced that are provable or primarily established by witnesses, only if given
the opportunity to confront those witnesses face-to-face at trial.4" He explained
his conclusion by reference to the underlying purpose of
confrontation-assuring fair trials. While confrontation's purpose is to secure
fairness, it must also secure the perception of fairness. Thus, Justice Scalia
sprinkled his Coy opinion with cliches, "look me in the eye and say that," "it
is always more difficult to lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his
back"' and "[i]n this country if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must
'
come up in front."436
Since the text of the Sixth Amendment is clear, exceptions cannot exist.
Faced with explaining the exceptions that were plentiful in the Court's previous
decisions, Justice Scalia advised that in previous cases the Court was dealing
not with the explicit right of confrontation set forth in the Sixth Amendment,
but rather with implications of that right, including the right to crossexamination, the right to confrontation outside the trial setting, and the right to
exclude certain out-of-court statements from the trial. In those areas, to which
the Confrontation Clause might not even apply, it is appropriate to consider and
perhaps accommodate other interests. But even when only rights that are
implicit to confrontation are implicated, more than a generalized assertion is
required to interfere. However, when the right interfered with was the "right
narrowly and explicitly set forth," no other interests were relevant and no
accommodations allowed.437

It was Justice Scalia's dicta about compromising rights implicit to
confrontation that prompted the concurring opinion in Coy, the state's reactions
to Coy,43 the Craig majority opinion,439 and the retractions Scalia made in

Craig." When the Craig majority grasped Justice Scalia's dicta in Coy and
utilized it to frame an exception to what Justice Scalia considered the essence

authored by Justice Marshall. See id. at 748-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
433. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
434. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
435. 487 U.S. at 1017.
436. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018, 1019 (citations omitted).
437. See id. at 1020-21.
438. See generally Ralph H. Kohlmann, The Presumption of Innocence: Patchingthe
TatteredCloakAfter Maryland v. Craig, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 389 (1996) (examining the harmful
effects that alternative testimonial procedures have on the defendant's presumption of
innocence); Karen L. Tomlinson, Note, Maryland v. Craig: Televised Testimony andan Evolving
Concept of Confrontation, 36 VILL. L. REv. 1569 (1991) (proposing that the purpose and
rationale of the Clause are served by the Craig holding).
439. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
440. See id. at 860-70 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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of the Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia refined his earlier viewpoint. He
began his chiding opinion with a hypothetical undoubtedly intended to show
4
In the
the majority the potential negative outcome of its decision.
suggesting
circumstances
hypothetical, a parent is accused by a child (under
motive to fabricate) and is convicted without ever having the benefit of looking
2
at the child at trial and inquiring as to the allegation." Justice Scalia's
hypothetical applied with equal force to hearsay and Bruton cases.
In his Craigdissent, Justice Scalia exposed, as he saw it, the error of the
majority's thinking. What the majority had done was merge the two aspects of
confrontation-the absolute, determinant textual right to face-to-face
confrontation and the implications of that right." 3 In doing this, the majority
recharacterized the explicit right (to face-to-face confrontation) as a
"preference" and subjected it to a benefit-burden analysis more appropriately
applied to the lesser implicit rights.'
To make his viewpoint more palatable, Justice Scalia sought to
demonstrate that his absolute determinant text theory was consistent with the
Court's hearsay and Bruton decisions. 44 Otherwise he would have been faced
with an unattractive proposition-asserting that the Confrontation Clause was
absolute in its requirement that prosecutions be based on live witnesses
testifying under oath at trial in the presence of the factfinder.
Thus, Justice Scalia opined that while the text of the Confrontation Clause
is absolute and not subject to exceptions, implications that arise from6
confrontation have always yielded to the necessities of the trial process.
Implications arising from constitutional rights are, by definition, a matter of
judicial interpretation subject to a test of reason, allowing compromise when
necessity arises. On the other hand, no amount of necessity can alter the
determinant text of a constitutional right. To the contrary, the text is
determinant to assure that policy, politics, and convenience do not interfere
with its absolute requirements." 7
Having divided his confrontation issues into two kinds-those that raise
issues under the definitive text and those that involve only implied rights,
Justice Scalia endorsed the Court's hearsay cases, albeit with a new
explanation. The Confrontation Clause does not prohibit, by its explicit terms,
hearsay evidence." 8 While the text of the Clause might imply that hearsay
evidence would violate confrontation, since that principle flows only by

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

See id. at 861.
Id.
See id. at 862.
See id. at 863, 870.
Craig,497 U.S. at 863-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 865.
See id.
Id. at 864-65.
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implication and is not explicitly expressed in the text, it may be limited as
necessity and policy require." 9
To further cement his theory, Justice Scalia wrote that a "witness," as that
word is used in the text of the Confrontation Clause, is one who gives
testimony in a judicial proceeding.450 It does not include one who knows or
sees, but only one who appears and gives testimony. Given this limited
definition of "witness," Justice Scalia's Confrontation Clause analysis is
theoretically defensible. It depends, however, on ignoring the practicalities of
trial process.
Justice Scalia's approach gives the prosecutor the keys to the defendant's
constitutional right. By choosing who to make a "witness," the prosecution
controls who the defense has a right to confront. Justice Scalia would
undoubtedly respond that the defense has a right to call any witness to the
stand. But that response is no consolation at all. In the realities of criminal
practice, those knowledgeable about the case who are aligned with the
prosecution will decline the defense's attempts to interview them before trial.
Criminal procedure rules and statutes provide the defense with copies of the
witness's statements only after they testify on a direct examination.451 Calling
a person to the stand who has not been interviewed and whose statement has
not been viewed for the opportunity to "confront" them is a risk that few skilled
criminal defense lawyers would take.
3. Justice Thomas, Joined by Justice Scalia, PartII

In a case that turned on Justice Scalia's definition of "witness," Justice
Thomas expressed his Confrontation Clause rationale. In the Court's decision
in White v. Illinois,452 Justice Thomas considered whether the Court had
unnecessarily confused the relationship between hearsay and confrontation in
its cases. The "critical phrase" of the Clause, Justice Thomas wrote, was
"witnesses against him."4 3 The Court had wrongly concluded
that hearsay
declarants are "witnesses against" an accused, thus inappropriately intertwining
454
the two doctrines.
White was the exact outcome feared by Justice Harlan in Green before he
altered his view in his concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans.455 In White no

449. Id.
450. Id. at 864-65. Justice Scalia chose this definition because the other definition given
("one who knows or sees any thing; one personally present") "is excluded in the
Sixth
Amendment by the words following the noun: 'witnesses againsthim.' The phrase obviously
refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial." Craig,497 U.S. at 864-65

(Scalia, J., dissenting).
451. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
452. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).

453. Id. at 359.
454. Id.

455. See Dutton, 400 U.S. 74, 93-100 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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finding had been made that the witnesses would be traumatized by testifying
or that they would be unable to communicate in the courtroom. Rather, the
State, for whatever reasons, chose to prove its case without the declarants.456
Justice Thomas proposed his own remedy457 for the jumbled jurisprudence
that surrounds the Confrontation Clause. In Justice Thomas's view, a possible
"formulation" is as follows:
The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to
any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions. 58
Justice Scalia concurred in the Thomas conclusion.
V.

FAIRNESS AND CONFRONTATION

A. Need for a UniversalApproach
One of the reasons that the Supreme Court grants certiorari in state
criminal cases is to assist state court trial judges in applying federal
constitutional law.459 When the Court's decisions are confusing and
inconsistent, state courts are deprived of that guidance. Furthermore, the quality
of justice suffers, and the promise of equal justice under law disappears.
A scholar of the Confrontation Clause can, in most instances, decipher
which of the Court's approaches apply to a confrontation issue. State trial
judges have neither the motivation nor the time to review some fifty Supreme
Court Confrontation Clause cases to determine how to rule on an evidentiary
objection raised during trial. Most certainly, they can generally avoid reversal
by finding that evidence fits within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, but many
desire to try cases fairly and not merely to avoid reversal. A more easily
understood and universal approach is needed to assist trial judges, who must
rule on confrontation clause issues at the first juncture, and appellate judges,
who must determine the validity of those rulings.
Similarly, a more consistent approach will assist lawyers on both sides of
the criminal justice system. The present state of confrontation jurisprudence
invites advocates to base arguments on numerous approaches and, in effect,
456. See White, 502 U.S. at 349-51, 358.
457. Justice Thomas relies upon what he calls the Wigmore-Harlan view of confrontation
for his interpretation. He defines their view this way: the Confrontation Clause confers on a

"defendant the right to confront and cross-examine only those witnesses who actually appear and
testify at trial." White, 502 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
458. Id. at 365.
459. See SUP. CT. R. 10(c)
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requires a case-by-case determination. This ad hoc approach not only
complicates the job of trial judges and trial lawyers, but also complicates and
increases the work of appellate courts.
The Court's Confrontation Clause cases seemingly present an open
invitation to prosecutors to try their cases without live witnesses. While any
effective trial strategist might question the approach, veteran criminal defense
lawyers know that the State's case is often improved when certain witness
statements are repeated by police officers, cloaked in authority, or by medical
or mental health professionals, cloaked in trust. By utilizing others to tell the
witness's story, the government can avoid having the witness observed by and
tested in front of the jury. If a witness's statement fits within a hearsay
exception, the informed prosecutor will evaluate whether to call that witness
to the stand based not upon fairness, but upon whether the witness's demeanor
or responses to cross-examination might negatively impact the jury.
The Court's current solution to the Confrontation Clause puzzle is
complicated by emerging state hearsay exceptions. Many states have
supplemented the hearsay exceptions set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence
with additional, policy-driven exceptions.46 For example, several states have
child hearsay exceptions making virtually any statement of a child, offered in
a proceeding involving abuse of the child, admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. 46 ' There can be little doubt that these exceptions do not fit within
the "firmly rooted" rubric. 4 2 In each case, then, the trial court must undergo an

evaluation of the specific facts and circumstances to determine whether
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness exist. That analysis is subject to
an independent review by the appellate courts under the Court's Lilly decision.
State-by-state, case-by-case, analyses can lead only to varying results and
varying degrees of fairness. While state prerogative must be honored in many
aspects of law, application of a fundamental, explicit federal constitutional right
should not be an area of state prerogative.
A uniform, understandable approach to the Confrontation Clause is
necessary to assist judges and lawyers in light of emerging state-law hearsay
exceptions, prosecutorial temptations, and case-by-case determinations. More
importantly, a uniform approach is necessary to assure fairness and integrity in
the trial process.

460. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine
Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 696-702.
461. See id. at 698 n.20 (listing statutes).
462. Most of these statutes address trustworthiness as a function of the time, content, and
circumstances ofthe child's statement and admit the statement ifthese "provide sufficient indicia
of reliability." Id. at 698. This is in sharp contrast to the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncement that a firmly rooted hearsay exception is one that "over time [has proven] to
remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would
the obligation of an oath." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
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B. A New Approach
1. Reasons Supporting a New Approach
The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has reduced a
fundamental constitutional right to a rule of evidence. The Court has justified
this restructuring by equating reliability with confrontation. Thus, the
conclusion is that as long as reliable evidence is introduced, the purpose of the
Clause is satisfied. This substitution of reliability for confrontation, however,
begs the question.
The plurality decision in Lilly and other recent events have underscored the
unfairness of the Court's present approach to the Confrontation Clause. Having
accepted its formula that "hearsay exception = satisfaction of the confrontation
clause" since White, at least a plurality of the Court has been awakened to the
unfairness under the circumstances presented in Lilly. The plurality decision
demonstrates both a recognition of the unfairness generated by the rule the
Court created and a struggle to restore some meaning to the fundamental
constitutional principle.
But the Lilly solution is not the only solution. Respectfully, neither is it the
right solution. The Lilly plurality decision requires a case-by-case analysis at
both the trial and appellate levels to determine whether the Confrontation
Clause has been satisfied. It also requires a careful parsing of the introduced
statement, line-by-line, word-by-word, to determine its admissibility. Such an
approach is inefficient, at the least. More importantly, such a test will produce
unfair, inconsistent results which will likely escape correction due to the
harmless error doctrine on appeal and new, rigid standards of federal habeas
review.
2.

Visual Demonstrationof the Needfor a New Approach

Graphic portrayals of the Court's reconstruction of the Confrontation
Clause, from the early decisions which focused on the nexus between
confrontation, counsel, and the right to a jury trial, and in which the Court
viewed the constitutional right as fundamental, to the recent decisions in which
the Court has interchanged the concepts of reliability, as defined by hearsay
exceptions and confrontation, are found in Charts A and B. Chart A identifies,
in chronological order, the evolving requirements for confrontation in each of
the four kinds of cases discussed in this Article. Chart B depicts, again
chronologically, confrontation requirements in hearsay cases as they devolved.
Both charts visually demonstrate a drastic regression from the early cases-in
which the Court recognized that the government was required to introduce live
witnesses, observed by the trier of fact and subjected to cross-examination-to
modem cases-in which the government chooses whether to introduce
evidence second-hand, and thereby avoid confrontation altogether. This
regression demonstrates an increased concern with the inconvenience and
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difficulty caused by a confrontation requirement. What that concern and the
resulting diminution of the right ignores is that constitutional rights, by their
nature, are, and probably should be, inconvenient for the government.
To prevent a reoccurrence of the discomfort caused by an application of the
Court's jurisprudence, such as that present in Lilly, the Court must candidly
recognize that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is more than a
restatement of evidence rules. Its authors were not concerned about the
potential inconvenience of the government; rather, they feared the
consequences of trials without confrontation, trials at which accusations were
not heard or tested, trials at which juries were deprived of observing a sworn
witness testify and be cross-examined in their presence.
Adhering to the right of confrontation, just as adhering to all fundamental
constitutional rights, will cause some criminal prosecutions to fail. Its
application should not be viewed as a hurdle to efficient, successful
prosecution, but rather as a barrier to unfair, unconfronted convictions. It is not
a rule to be maneuvered around in order to assure more convictions; rather it
is a rule to be demanded in order to guarantee ultimate fairness.
A criminal trial is in part a search for truth. But it is also
a system designed to protect "freedom" by insuring that no
one is criminally punished unless the State has first succeeded
in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury that the
defendant is guilty. That task is made more difficult by the
Bill of Rights .... The Framers decided that the benefits to
be derived from the kind of trial required by the Bill of Rights
were well worth any loss in "efficiency" that resulted.463
3. A New Approach
An interpretation of the Clause that would render more consistent and
reliable results would require the Court to return to its early Confrontation
Clause cases and face the error of its reconstruction. The Court must
undoubtedly overrule precedent, but only precedent that was incorrect from the
outset.
The Court should adopt an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that
assures what the right guarantees-the right to confront the witnesses against
an accused. The interpretation should require the government to prove its case
by witnesses who testify in open court, before the factfinder, subject to crossexamination. Statements that fit within hearsay exceptions should be admitted
for evidentiary purposes, but should not be sufficient to satisfy the
government's burden of proof on any element of the crime.

463. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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At the end of the State's proof, the trial judge would determine, upon
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, whether the State had offered
evidence of each element of the crime sufficient to defeat the motion."4 If the
evidence consisted solely of statements introduced as hearsay exceptions, the
government's case would fail. If the evidence consisted partially of witness
testimony and partially of statements introduced as hearsay exceptions, the trial
court would have to determine whether sufficient evidence of each element was
presented through live witness testimony. This inquiry by the trial judge would
not differ substantially from the inquiry trial judges make every time a motion
for judgment of acquittal is made in a case involving circumstantial evidence,
accomplice testimony, or confessions of the accused.
Following the defense case and the ruling on any renewed motion for
judgment of acquittal, the court would instruct the jury as to the use of the
evidence. The jury instruction could be formulated along these lines:
Members of the jury, you must find that all the essential
elements of the case have been proven by the government
beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, you must find that
each element was established beyond a reasonable doubt by
proof consisting of exhibits or of the testimony of witnesses
who were called to testify before you. Any witness statement
that was offered through another witness may be considered
by you as corroboration, but it alone cannot support a finding
of any element of the case.
The trial judge would already have dismissed those cases in which sufficient
evidence was not presented. The jury instruction would advise jurors how to
evaluate evidence when, despite sufficient evidence introduced, the jury chose
to disregard some of the testimony due to inconsistencies or impeachment."65
Critics might argue that this proposed interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause is judge-made and not textually required. That criticism is without
merit. Read plainly and literally, and consistently with history, the Clause
supports an interpretation that disallows all hearsay evidence in a criminal case.
However, no court and perhaps no scholar, has urged such a restrictive reading,

464. The standard a trial court uses to determine whether to grant a motion for judgment
of acquittal made at the close of the government's proof is whether "any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Black,
815 S.W.2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991) (citations omitted).

465. Standard jury instructions advise jurors that they may disregard all or part of the
testimony of a witness who has been impeached. For example, if the trial judge denied the

motion for judgment of acquittal because the State had introduced some evidence by which a
rational trier of fact might find the presence of an element, but the jury disregarded the testimony
of that witness for credibility reasons, the instruction would assure that the jury did not convict
if the only remaining evidence on a particular element was a statement introduced as a hearsay
exception.
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perhaps because although history does not defy such a reading, neither does it
support it. If the Clause must then be read to allow hearsay evidence, it does
not follow that admitting that evidence should result in a denial of the specific
right provided by the Clause. An accommodation of the Clause's protection
and the rules of evidence need not result in its destruction. It is far more
defensible for such an accommodation to effect the rules more harshly than it
does the constitutional right.
Furthermore, in other contexts the Court has recognized that there may be
a hierarchy of evidence. For example, for a conviction in a criminal case to be
based totally upon circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances must
be "so clearly interwoven and connected that the finger of guilt is pointed
unerringly at the Defendant and the Defendant alone."466 Similarly, accomplice
testimony in many states is insufficient to sustain a conviction without
corroboration.467 Some fact, independent of the accomplice's testimony, which,
if taken by itself, leads to an inference that the crime was committed and that
the accused committed it, is required to convict.46 A third example is provided
by the evidence standards that apply to confessions of the accused. Like
accomplice testimony, the confession of an accused cannot be the sole basis for
a conviction. Some corroboration is required.469 Confessions, without
corroboration, similarly are insufficient to sustain a conviction. In each of these
contexts, and even in some civil contexts, courts have realized that evidence
must be viewed in a hierarchal manner. Some kinds of evidence carry more
weight than others. Providing a similar rule in the Confrontation Clause context
is no different. It accommodates government interest without sacrificing
fundamental constitutional rights.

466. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 175.
467. See, e.g., State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994) (stating that
corroborative evidence is sufficient "if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the crime").
468. See id.
469. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); see, e.g., United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878,882 (10th Cir.
1989) ("In order to admit hearsay evidence offered to exculpate the accused under rule
804(b)(3), the proponent of the evidence must show.., sufficient corroboration to indicate
trustworthiness of the statement."); United States v. Rasmussen, 790 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1986)
("[T]he corroboration requirement, has been read into Rule 804(b)(3) to satisfy the confrontation
clause rights of an accused .. ");
United States v. Ospina, 739 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1984)
("[Tihe showing of corroborating circumstances must do more than tend to indicate the
trustworthiness of the statements; they must clearly indicate it.").
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VI. CONCLUSION

"In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....

The United States Supreme Court must abandon its approach to the
Confrontation Clause which ties the clause to rules of evidence and restore the
Clause to its rightful place as an important, interdependent fundamental right
essential to the presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, and the right to
a trial by jury. Until the Court does so, inconsistent and unfair applications will
result in the conviction of those who never had the opportunity to confront their
accusers. Such a result was never intended, and would not be sanctioned, by
those who passed the Sixth Amendment.

470. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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